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Economic Growth and Technological
Change in the Long Run




This paper reviews the literature on technological change in relation to
economic growth with the aim to bring different strings of the literature
together. On the one hand it reviews the theory on the standard neo-classical
growth models as well as modern endogenous growth theories that
incorporate learning by doing, education and monopolistic elements. Besides,
it deals historical and empirical approaches to technological change and
growth. These include empirical studies on growth accounts, growth
regressions, sectoral growth performance as well as empirical tests of R&D-
models. The historical approach emphasises the importance of path
dependency of technological change as a major explanatory factor for
persistent differences in growth performance. It is argued that a systematic
integration of the various approaches will be necessary to fully understand the
dynamics of long term growth. More specifically, it is proposed to integrate
the concept of "path dependency" in the growth models.
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Introduction
Since its early days, the economic discipline has been interested in issues
concerning economic growth, as these concern the wealth of nations and its
people in the long run. Various scholars have explored the area of economic
growth since the publication of the book in which Adam Smith (1776)
analysed labour specialization in a pin factory, which increased the
possibilities of economic growth. Malthus (1815) had a pessimistic view in
which population growth would overcome the growth in agricultural
production. Ricardo (1817), J. S. Mill (1848) and Marx (1867) also
concentrated on capitalistic growth. The early scholars did not pay much
attention to business cycles. During the period 1870 to 1920 the marginalistic
revolution was set in by Jevons (1871), Walras (1874) and Menger (1871).
1
Other scholars like Schumpeter (1934) and Allyn Young (1928)
remained occupied with the analysis of economic growth. Schumpeter, for
example, developed the theory of creative destruction, in which discoveries
by entrepreneurs with temporary monopoly power generated new knowledge,
which were spilled over the whole economy through imitation and which
shifted the economy to another (higher) level of income. The dynamics of the
economy was caused by competition. When Schumpeter became older, he
observed a different development in the economy. Monopoly positions
appeared to be able to exist in the longer run. Schumpeter constructed a
theory of trust capitalism in which long-run monopoly positions existed. In
both theories technology was the engine which drives economic growth. Neo-
classical economists, Post-Keynesians and evolutionary economists have used
Schumpeter’s ideas and that of other early scholars in different ways.
Schumpeter (1934) was also the first to identify and define
technological change more clearly than its predecessors. He defined
technological change in a very broad sense as the “carrying out of new
combinations”, which generate growth along qualitative changes of economic
variables. Schumpeter enumerates five types of innovation. The first concerns
the introduction of a new good or of a new quality of a good. In the second
case a new method of production is introduced. The third type of innovation is
the opening of a new market, the fourth concerns the discovery of new
resources or intermediates, and the fifth type introduces a new organisational
form (Schumpeter, 1983, p. 66). Technological change emerges from
technical innovations generated by research and development, patenting and
software, and productivity-enhancing developments in the field of education,
management and marketing.
                                                 
  References are given in M. Blaug (1978),  Economic Theory in Retrospect.2
Another revival in theory of economic growth occurred with the
construction of the Swan/Solow neo-classical models of economic growth. As
these models still treated technological change as exogenous to the growth
process, some early attempts to develop endogenous growth models took
place during the 1960s (Arrow, 1962). However, the endogenous growth
models were put at the centre stage of growth theory during the 1980s by
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).
During the first part of the twentieth century, substantial progress was
also made in the field of the empirical analysis of economic growth. This was
caused by the creation of national accounts, first in advanced countries and
since World War II across the world. During the 1950s and 1960s, many
empirical growth studies were published by, among others, Kuznets (1965),
Abramovitz (1956) and Kendrick (1956). Particularly important from an
international perspective were the growth accounts for nine advanced nations
by Denison (1967).
Economic historians also became increasingly involved in the
discussion on the relation between technological change and economic
growth. They continued to emphasise the specific characteristics of different
technological regimes, the importance of institutional arrangements
concerning property rigths, and the variation in impact on long term growth.
The idea was formalised in the concept of "path dependency" of technological
change, which has dominated the economic-historical literature on
technological change in the past decades (David, 1975).
This literature survey discusses theoretical, empirical and historical
approaches to the explanation of the impact of technological progress on
economic growth. In chapter 1, some important concepts of productivity
growth are given and the economic development of Western countries since
1870 is described. The next two chapters deal with the neo-classical theories
of growth. The development of these theories was stimulated by the
construction of the Swan/Solow growth model, which assumed technological
progress to generate sustained growth (chapter 2). Modern growth theories,
developed in particular from the mid-1980s onwards, tried to endogenize
technological change (chapter 3). Of course, other factors, such as capital
accumulation and population growth, may affect productivity growth, but I
will concentrate on the role of technology.
The empirical and historical approaches, described in chapter 4,
consider data on technology, productivity growth and its components and try
to induce a specific pattern. Some scholars considered technological change
from the viewpoint of economic history, emphasizing the path-dependency of
growth. Various empirical economists estimated growth equations with
technological change as one of the explanatory variables. The underlying
assumptions of these regressions came from formal theory, but they were3
adjusted if the facts called for it. Others tried to decompose productivity
growth and the famous ‘residual’ in growth accounts. A more microeconomic
approach was used by those who searched for measures of technological
change itself with data on patents or R&D.
Clearly the theoretical and empirical approaches have been influenced
by each other over times, but received major scientific attention at different
times. For example, when the development of neo-classical growth theory
came more or less to a standstill in the 1960s, substantial progress was made
with empirical studies, especially growth accounting, during the late 1960s,
the 1970s and early 1980s. In the mid-1980s the growth theory underwent a
new revival, but empirical studies remained scarce or very crude. Recently,
more empirical tests of hypotheses of economic theory have been carried out,
because more data are available nowadays and which are even more accurate
than before. However, whereas formal theories have not been put to the test in
proper empirical studies, some empirical and historical approaches are not
based on sound theoretical models which could give any insight in the nature
of growth and its determinants. Therefore, in the conclusion I will emphasize
the gains of a synthesis of the different approaches. An integration of the
different strings of the literature is needed to construct a long run sectoral
model that takes into account path-dependency of technological progress and
international technological spillovers.4
1 Growth differentials
1.1 Productivity growth, convergence and catch-up
Economic growth refers to the trend of the time paths for macroeconomic
variables such as national income (Wan, 1971). The increase in real GDP per
capita or labour productivity (GDP per hour worked) of a country is an
indicator for increases in the national income per capita or worker. The growth
rates of per capita GDP or labour productivity differ significantly among
countries and in time. These growth differentials matter because they have a
large impact on economic welfare in the long run. In order to understand the
large differences in standards of living, it is necessary to explain the
deviations in long-run growth rates (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
Various scholars agree on which economic forces are the most
important determinants of productivity growth, such as technological change,
although they have different views on how to estimate the relative impact of
these forces. Historians and economists divide the past in different periods or
epochs to indicate that in each period specific forces were important, which
have relatively less influence in other periods. In Maddison’s (1995) view, the
transition from one phase of development to another is an historical accident
or the consequence of a sort of system shock. The new situation will change
policy attitudes and institutions. In section 1.2 the historical development of
technology and economic growth is sketched. This story makes clear that
productivity levels and growth rates have differed across countries and over
time. However, the stylized facts show that real per capita GDP in Western
countries had been increasing since the industrialization in the late eighteenth
century.
Tables B.1 to B.3 in Appendix B confirm this image. These tables
present the development of GDP per capita (B.1), the growth rates of GDP per
capita (B.2) and labour productivity (B.3) in six countries. These countries
belong to the group which is economically developed well nowadays and the
tables show that the average growth rates of these countries have been
positive from the nineteenth century onwards. This picture may change if
short periods are considered. For example, in the Second World War some
countries experienced a negative growth rate. The image also changes if
developing countries are presented. However, according to Maddison (1995)
the growth rate of world per capita income increased since 1870. In this
period, the world population increased by a factor 5 in the period 1820 to
1992, while GDP per capita increased eight-fold (Maddison, 1995, table 1.2).
Tables B.2 and B.3 show that the growth rates differed among
countries. The deviations changed through time. For example, in the period5
1950-1973, the difference between the growth rates is larger than in the
previous period. From 1950 to 1973, after a period of war and depression, the
Western economies experienced a Golden Age of economic opportunities,
which they did not realize in the same measure. In the period 1973-1992 the
deviations among the growth rates decreased. The difference between these
six countries and developing countries is, however, still large. From the
eighteenth century onwards, the spread between the growth rates of advanced
countries and developing countries had been increased.
The changes in spreads among growth rates or per capita income
levels of countries are described by the concepts of convergence and catch-
up. Various definitions of convergence are in use. Growth theorists and those
who do cross country regressions of productivity growth on different possible
determinants use the so called b-convergence concept (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995). Absolute b-convergence refers to the hypothesis that
economies with low levels of income per capita tend to grow faster in per
capita terms than economies with high levels, so that both kinds of economies
eventually have the same income levels per capita, thus are converged.
Evidence has, however, shown that absolute convergence only takes place
within groups of homogeneous countries or regions, which act in similar
institutional, legal and economic environments with the same technologies
and tastes. An example are the states of the USA or the regions in Japan. In
order to show that convergence occurred, growth regressions were corrected
for differences in country-specific parameters, so that these show that a form
of conditional b-convergence occurred between groups of homogeneous
countries (Mankiw et al., 1992).
b-convergence is often confused with another definition of
convergence, s-convergence. The latter concept means that the dispersion or
inequality of real per capita income across a group of economies reduces over
time. Dispersion is  measured by the sample variance of the income per capita
of a country in the sample. If b-convergence occurs, this does not imply that
s-convergence takes place (Quah, 1993). Empirical studies showed that the
standard deviations of the logarithm of incomes per capita had increased, so
no s-convergence among countries has taken place. Sometimes the concept
of relative convergence is used as a counterpart of absolute convergence. In
panel studies the real income level of a country or region is divided by the
average income level of a group to which the country or region belongs,
thereby abstracting from the average growth of the group. So one can look at
the development over time and determine whether relative convergence takes
place (Ben David, 1995, Kuper, 1995).
Finally, economic historians use a catch-up concept. This concept
implies that a country tries to catch up with another country which performs6
the highest productivity levels, whereas ‘convergence’ implies that in the long
run countries with different initial growth rates tend to grow at about the same
rate. In Fagerberg’s (1995) opinion, catch-up emphasizes the differences in
scope for imitation, and the standard neo-classical transition dynamics the
differences in profitability and capital accumulation (p. 273). In any case, an
inverse relationship exists between initial GDP per capita and the growth rate.
But in the historians’ view, GDP per capita is an indicator for the degree of
technological advancement of the country, whereas the neo-classicals
consider GDP per capita as a proxy for the capital-labour ratio.
Catch-up should not be interpreted too narrowly. For a following
country, there are different possible growth paths to the pursued productivity
level with use of different (mixes of) technology systems and institutional
arrangements (chapter 4). These technologies and institutions may be
developed well, although the highest possible productivity level is not
achieved. Patterns of ‘convergence and divergence’ take place because of the
differences in growth paths among countries. So, for example, the catch-up of
the USA with the UK in productivity levels in the beginning of the twentieth
century cannot be generalized for other countries with different technologies
or for other periods.
1.2 Economic growth in the 19th and 20th century
Kuznets (1965) was convinced that the economic growth in Western Europe
in the past two hundred years differed fundamentally in nature from that of the
protocapitalistic period (1500-1800). In the protocapitalistic period Western
European countries underwent many important institutional, social and
political changes which prepared them on a period of a large economic
potential (in absolute and relative terms) to increase productivity and improve
technology      (p. 8). Therefore growth differentials are interesting because
the economic potential is realised in different ways and measures. Maddison
(1995) enumerates various factors which changed before and after 1800.
Rationalisation, the end of feudalism, the emergence of a system of nation
state which were tied in international trade, modest population growth, change
in policies with respect to democratic institutions and the welfare state,
international cooperation: all played a role in the fast Western economic
growth in the 19th and 20th century.
The first signs of modern industrialization in Western Europe could
already be observed in the eighteenth century, when cotton, iron and steel
industries were founded and steam power was introduced. In this phase, the
nature of technological systems used in production changed, but the
technological developments were diffused gradually and productivity growth
was only affected significantly in all Western countries in course of time.7
Anno 1820 the world was recovering from an era of wars. European countries
and the Western Offshoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and US)
experienced economic growth from 1820 onwards. In the Western Offshoots
the growth rate in this period was higher than it would ever be. They had huge
natural resources, fast population growth and were not mixed up in wars like
the European countries before 1820.
Of  all countries, the early industrializer Great Britain did best in the
nineteenth century. The UK acquired an advantageous position in both
technology and productivity. The Continental entrepreneurs differed from
their British colleagues in attitude and had to cope with different institutions.
For instance, the British were more willing to develop inventions for
commercial application. This was because the British government, which had
reduced the feudal and landownings powers gradually form the seventeenth
century on, was able to create a more stable economic sittuation than the
Continental governments could do. Dutch economic institutions, which were
so successful in the eighteenth century, were copied and adjusted by the
British entrepreneurs. The parliamental reforms and the commercial
orientation of the entrepreneurs contributed to the good economic
performance of the UK. British policy focused on a free (international) trade
system, removing tariff barriers and other regulations.
An important development which reduced economic uncertainty
significantly in the nineteenth century, was the emergence of property rights
protected by law. These property rights were important to realize economies
of scale (created by companies), to encourage innovations (by patenting), to
improve the efficiency of factor markets and to reduce market imperfections.
As North and Thomas (1973) stated: “... economic growth will occur if
property rights make it worthwile to undertake socially productive activity” (p.
8). If the potential profit is larger than the transaction cost involved in the
economic activity, it will be established and enforced by property rights. In
the UK property rights were better and earlier protected than on the Continent.
The well developed British system of banking also lowered transaction costs
and patenting was tied up by law.
In 1870, the world trade system was liberal compared to the previous
century. International trade had increased strongly and transport costs were
decreased, so that specialization yielded profits for countries involved in
international trade. The US began to catch up with the UK in productivity
terms. The US succeeded in this respect, because it had a huge domestic
market with low economic barriers and because the American entrepreneurs
constituted a more  economically free state than the British. Moreover, the US
could also borrow technology cheaply from Europe, although this was
adjusted to American circumstances. The Americans lacked skilled labour and
American demand required highly standardized products, so that they8
developed labour-saving techniques for mass production (Habakkuk, 1962).
This occurred also because of the specific attitudes of American
entrepreneurs. The American techniques might have been very resource
intensive and relatively inefficient, but the American products could compete
well in the international market.
So technological progress, whatever its nature be, had occurred in all
countries, but it was slower than after 1870. In the period 1870 to 1913
communication methods improved further and factor mobility increased
strongly (Maddison, 1995). Large-scale migration of labour, more foreign
direct investments and capital flows took place among European countries and
Western Offshoots, particularly from the UK. Because the nature of  the
technological systems differed widely among the countries, only embodied
diffusion of technological knowledge took place, knowledge embodied in
physical and human capital. Although little knowledge spilled over, a
convergence in relative factor price ratios took place in the subsequent
decades, so that it became easier and cheaper to apply foreign technological
knowledge for trade purposes.
1870 also marked the start of a period of global acceleration of growth
in productivity. International trade grew less strongly than before and after
1870 some new tariff barriers were established. Furthermore, it was a period
of political changes, such as the abolition of slavery in the US and the
emergence of Italy and Germany as nation states. Property rights were
considered important everywhere. The initial position of Germany and Japan,
the latecomer industrializers, differed from that of the UK and US. In Japan a
purposive state policy played a very important role in the enhancement of
productivity growth. Japan, however, needed more time to catch up with the
US in productivity terms than Germany did. In Germany, education and
management organisation were spearheads of international policy (Vernon,
1989). In this respect Germany played a pioneering role, for human capital
became very important for all countries in the twentieth century, a century in
which innovations became more and more science driven.
The following epoch, 1913-1950, was characterized by war,
depression and protectionism (Maddison, 1995).  A common development in
Europe was the increasing role of government as a driving force of economic
growth and allocation of resources. After the First World War an international
golden standard determined international relations and the trade volume
increased. But these development ended with the depression of 1929-1933,
which origined in the US and Germany. The collapse of the financial system
affected international order and policy. The golden standard was rejected and
a protectionistic wave went through many countries. Trade decreased and
capital flowed from Europe to the US. In the late 1930s most economies
recovered, mainly in Europe and Latin America, but governments intervened9
more than ever. The US did not recover fully (despite the New Deal) until
1941.
The impact of the Second World War was uneven by country. In
Europe large losses of lifes and damage to the capital stock determined the
course of economic development immediately after war. Not until 1950 the
West European countries were fully recovered in income terms from war. In
wartime the US economy had experienced a large increase in its labour
productivity and technological progressed faster. This could happen because
the US investments and R&D expenditures increased, and newly organized
giant firms were established, which captured new economies of scale.
However, little diffusion of American technological knowledge to other
countries occurred, because of the wars in Europe, the limited role of the US
in international trade and investment, the collapse of the US economy
immediately after the war and its isolationistic policy (Maddison, 1995). The
Marshall plan reflected the start of a new international order after the chaos in
Europe and the beginning of the Cold War.
After 1950 the world economy grew at a very high rate until the first
oil crisis in 1973. This period is sometimes called the Golden Age, because
the then prevailing growth rates have never been beaten again after this time
within Europe. The US grew slower than the Western European countries, but
it determined the international (monetary) order until the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. International trade expanded
and became more liberal. Domestic policies were devoted to economic growth
and full employment. European investments in physical capital increased in
response to larger technological opportunities to catch up with the US. The
US technology progressed faster and was diffused to West Europe, which
could adopt it with relatively low costs, because West European labour was
already highly educated. Moreover, more disembodied diffusion was taking
place, which was very important for small open countries like the Netherlands.
So technology systems of the Western countries converged in productivity.
After 1973 a global slowdown in income terms occurred. According to
Abramovitz (1991), West Europe performed still better than in the prewar
epochs. There came only an end to the acceleration of growth, although
convergence in productivity terms was still achievable. The oil shocks,
inflation and the breakdown of Bretton Woods hampered economic growth.
There was limited liberalisation of trade, so that it remained to increase, but
unemployment increased and remained high until recently. The US
experienced a slowdown in productivity and technological progress.10
2 The standard neo-classical model
2.1 Introduction
The neo-classical study of long-run economic growth underwent a revival
after the Second World War in a reaction to J. M. Keynes’ 1936 static analysis
of the economy. The recent developments in mainstream neo-classical growth
theory are mainly drafted upon the  ideas of Solow (1956, 1957), Swan
(1956) and Meade (1961). The Swan model (1956) was combined with that of
Solow in later textbooks. Keynes’ theory also formed a starting point for
Keynesian growth analysis constructed by, for instance, Harrod (1939) and
Domar (1946). In the so called Harrod-Domar model sustained positive
growth was only achieved by chance, because the parameters which
determine equilibrium were given. The natural growth rate, which equaled the
sum of the population growth rate and the rate of technological progress,
deviated nearly always from the warranted growth rate, the rate at which a
growth path is guaranteed (Wan, 1971). The warranted growth rate is not
necessarily stable (Hahn and Matthews, 1964), but in the neo-classical model
the steady state is stable.
Post-Keynesians like Kaldor (1961) and Robinson (1965) rejected the
neo-classical view that changes in production techniques can be described by
a neo-classical production function, which is too simple. Factors of production
were not completely substitutable. Furthermore, the price mechanism does not
work very well in the Keynesian setting. For instance, in contrast to the neo-
classical model, Kaldor assumed a varying propensity to save st at time t,
which responds to investments. Define Wt as the real wage rate and Nt as the
labour force, rt the profit rate and Kt as the real capital stock at time t. xw is the
share of savings out of labour income WtNt and xz is the share of savings out
of capital income. st is a function of the categorial income distribution. If we
assume that xw is equal to zero and that savings are a linear function of
technological progress, then the capital coefficient k = Kt/Yt is constant (Yt
being the output). Then just one production technique exists and st = xzkrt,
with xzk the yield on capital. The constant capital coefficient was an important
difference with the neo-classical theory. In neo-classical models the marginal
productivity of the factors of production K and L were equal to their factor
prices. Therefore, a change in real wage rate, profit rate or prices lead to a
change in the capital intensity K/L, which in turn changed the capital
coefficient K/Y. In Keynesian theory instead, only price changes lead to a
change in the savings rate, which affected the capital coefficient.11
The neo-classical scholars answered the Keynesian attacks with
extensions of the standard neo-classical models of Solow. Samuelson (1958)
provided a microfoundation for the neo-classical macroeconomic model. The
two-sector model of Meade (1961) is a straightforward extension of Solow’s
models. One result of Meade’s explorations was that the growth path may be
indeterminate because there could exist uniqueness problems. Models with
‘vintages’ in capital equipment took into account embodied technological
changes (Solow, 1962). Theories of the savings behaviour were developed by
among others Cass (1965). Tobin (1965) combined real effects with monetary
phenomena.
Sections 2.2 to 2.5 question whether the original Solow models of
1956 and 1957 are able to explain growth differences between countries. In
the 1956 Solow model technological progress and population growth generate
sustained positive growth of labour productivity, because they change the
capital-labour ratio. A weak point of the model is that both factors are not
explained within the framework. In 1957 Solow wrote an article on technical
change and the aggregate production function, in which the famous Solow
residual was formalized for the first time. This residual should be labelled the
Abramovitz residual, following Moses Abramovitz’ earlier work in 1956. The
term is, however, called the Solow residual in most recent literature on
economic growth. Recent developments in neo-classical growth theory are
directed to the explanation of the Solow residual (chapter 3).
2.2 The Solow model
In his 1956 paper, Solow applied assumptions of the Harrod-Domar model to
his own model. He assumed a constant savings rate and exponential
(exogenous) growth of labour at a constant rate n. Furthermore, he assumed a
linearly homogenous production function, and malleability of capital, which
are no necessary assumptions in the Harrod-Domar model. Solow rejected the
assumption of fixed proportions or complementarity of the Harrod-Domar
model. The relaxation of this assumption renders the conclusions of the
Harrod-Domar model invalid. A full employment balanced growth path may
be possible according to the neo-classicals (Wan, 1971, p. 43), while in
Keynesian theory adjustment to such a growth path is practically excluded, at
least via the K/Y ratio.
Solow assumed that labour and capital produce a single composite
good in one sector under the standard neo-classical conditions, which can be
consumed by households or used in production by firms. The market is
characterized by perfect competition, with smooth, instantaneous adjustment
of the homogeneous inputs, labour L and capital K, to changes in production.
Both inputs are fully employed. The propensity to save is exogenous and12
constant, because Solow did not want to deal with normative decisions about
savings and consumption over time or between individuals. Depreciation is
assumed to be zero (so that gross investments equal net investments), but this
does not affect the outcomes of the model. Investments are generated by, and
equal to, savings.
The production function has the form Y = F(K, L), where Y is output.
Production exhibits constant returns to scale in all inputs and diminishing
returns to capital and to labour. Capital accumulation occurs over time
through investments, net of depreciation (if any). Capital accumulation equals
Kº=dK/dt=I, the increase of the stock of capital. Net investment I is equal to
savings S = sY. Labour supply grows according to L0e
nt. Here n is the natural
growth rate. Because of full employment, labour supply is equal to labour
demand L in the production function. In a competitive market the marginal
productivity of capital and labour determine the real rental rate and the real
wage rate respectively.
The differential equation which determines the time path of capital
accumulation runs as follows:
Kº = dK/dt = I = sY = sF(K,L) = s F(K, L 0e
nt).
(1)
Properties of possible growth patterns can be deduced from the accumulation
equation. Suppose k = K/L, the ratio of capital to labour, with L = L0e
nt. Here
k is defined now in so called ‘efficiency units’, capital per natural unit of
labour (if technological progress, discussed in section 2.3, is taken into
account, k is defined in capital per effective unit of labour). Differentiating K =
kL0e
nt with respect to time and substituting the result in (1) gives (k°+nk)L0e
nt
= sF(K, L0e
nt). Because constant returns to scale apply, the production
function can be written in an ‘intensive form’, thus Y = F(K, L) is divided by
L. Then Y/L = y = F(K/L, 1) = F(k, 1) = f(k)  (Wan, 1971). Hence, dividing K
and L by L0e
nt and multiplying F by the same factor (and dividing both sides
by L0e
nt) gives:
kº = sf(k) - nk,                                               (2)
or
kº/k= sf(k)/k - n,          (3)
stating that the growth rate of k gk (= kº/k) is equal to the difference between
the warranted rate of growth sf(k)/k and the natural rate of growth n. k°
provides for capital deepening, while the amount nk is necessary capital
widening to hold k constant (Choi, 1983). If kº = 0, then the K/L-ratio is
constant. Then capital must expand at the same rate as the labour force,13
namely at rate n. The warranted rate of growth is then equal to the natural rate
n. One possible configuration of the savings curve sf(k) is depicted in figure 1.
The vertical axis measures the values of effective depreciation nk and gross





Figure 1. The Solow model (1956) in absence of technological change
In this form f(k) exhibits diminishing marginal productivity of capital and the
so called Inada conditions are fulfilled.
2 The intersection between the curves
of nk and sf(k) is where  kº = 0. The value k* fitted in this intersection is the
steady state value, where all economic variables grow at constant rates. The
steady state is also stable: If the initial capital stock k0 is less than the steady
state capital stock k*, then the figure shows that nk < sf(k). The accumulation
equation (2) tells us that k° will be positive, so capital will accumulate and k
will move towards the equilibrium value k*. If k0 > k*, k will decrease towards
k*. In short, in the steady state K and L grow at rate n. Because output per
capita y = f(k) and k* are constant, steady state output per capita must also be
constant and output grows at rate n. Hence, the levels of the variables will
increase at rate n, but variables per capita remain constant.
Other forms of savings curves than that of figure 1 are possible, in
some cases resulting in multiple equilibria, stable or unstable (Solow, 1956).
Above all, Solow’s conclusion is that in a neo-classical framework with factor
substitution and constant returns to scale, the natural rate is tied to the
warranted rate of growth by means of completely flexible factor prices. An
equilibrium will result, which does not depend on luck, such as in the Harrod-
                                                 
2 The Inada conditions are:  f’(k)>0;  f”(k)<0;  f’(0)=¥;  f’(¥)=0;  f(0)=0;  f(¥)=¥. A
production function f(k) satisfying these conditions is called “well-behaved”. According
to Sala-i-Martin (1990) the condition  f’(¥)=0 will be no longer valid in endogenous
growth models as discussed in chapter 3.14
Domar model, because actual growth is equal by definition to the warranted
rate of growth.
The Cobb-Douglas function Y = K
aL
b with constant returns to scale
(a+b=1) is an example of the savings curve drawn in figure 1. The Cobb-
Douglas function is often used in growth models, because the Inada
conditions apply and because the derivation of the steady state values is not
difficult. Moreover, in the 1950s it was believed that the Cobb-Douglas
function fitted actual growth well. The differential equation (2) turns to kº =
sk
a - nk with y = f(k) = k
a. The equilibrium rate k* equals (s/n)
1/b, with b = 1-
a.
3 By constant returns to scale, output asymptotically behaves like K and L
and grows at rate n.
Solow concluded that the full employment assumption might be
rejected. However, his goal was to “examine what might be called the tight-
rope view of economic growth and to see where more flexible assumptions
about production would lead a simple model” (Solow, 1956, p. 189). Solow
(1994) argued that the model works well without constant returns to scale, the
simplifying assumption of the model. The diminishing returns to capital only
spell that growth in the long run is completely independent of  investment,
and thus of savings. The output level can be changed permanently, but not the
growth rate per capita (or the slope of the trend path).
2.3 Technological change
In the Solow model the rate of growth of capital per worker gk is zero in the
long run. How did Solow then explain positive sustained growth? He assumed
an exogenous variable was the force behind growth, namely technological
change. This force could be represented in the aggregate production function
Y = F(K, L, t) by the variable t for time (Solow, 1957). This implies that
technological change is fully disembodied, because it depends only on time.
With technological progress embodied in new equipment, the capital stock
consists of machines of different ages or vintages. Solow developed such a
vintage model a few years later (1962).
A simple model of disembodied technological change can be given by
multiplying the production function by an increasing scale factor At:
Y = AtF(K,L).                          
(4)
                                                 












a. The accumulation equation (2)
turns to sk
a - nk. In the steady state k°=0, so sk
a = nk, hence k* = (s/n)
1/(1-a) = (s/n)
1/(b).15
This is Hicks neutral technological progress, which implies that the ratio of
marginal products remains constant. In figure 1 the savings curve would be
‘blown up’ (Solow, 1956, p.183). Solow (1956) extends his model with
labour-augmenting technological change, or Harrod-neutral technological
progress. Harrod neutrality means that the relative input shares remain
unchanged for a given K/Y. In the Cobb Douglas case, Harrod neutrality and
Hicks neutrality give the same result: Y = AF(K,L) = F(K,AL).
 Uzawa (1965)
proved that by definition, Harrod-neutrality is equivalent to labour-
augmenting technological progress. Labour-augmenting technological
progress implies that with the same amount of capital one needs less and less
labour to produce the same amount of output. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
argue that technological progress must always be labour-augmenting to have a
model with a steady state (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, pp. 54-55).
Technology At changes in time exponentially at rate x. In per capita
terms, the production function becomes y = f(k,At). In steady state the growth
rate of y is constant, so the average product of capital f[(At/k, 1)]/k must be
constant (other parameters are given). Because At grows at rate x, k = K/L
must grow at the same rate and thus is not constant.
If a ratio k’ = k/At = K/(AtL) is defined, this ratio is constant in the
steady state. k’ is capital per effective unit of labour. Output per effective unit
of labour can be written as y’ = f(k’). The accumulation equation changes to
k’° = sf(k’) - (n+x)k’       (2)’
or
k’°/k’ = sf(k’)/k’ - (n+x).       (2)”
Accumulation equation (2)’ is in the Cobb Douglas case
k’° = sk’ 
a - (n+x)k’.       (2)”’
The incorporation of technological change implies that in figure 1 the
nk line rotates upwards to a (n+x)k’ line, whereas sf(k) changes into sf(k’).
Since the Inada conditions are fulfilled, there are diminishing returns to capital
and the steady state capital intensity k’* is constant. Capital and output per
effective worker remain constant, but capital and output per capita grow
forever at rate x. Capital and output levels grow at rate n+x. Then the income
distribution and the capital-output ratio remain the same. In short, in the neo-
classical model sustained economic growth was achieved by using
technological change A as an exogenous variable.
Solow (1957) described a way of decomposing different sources of
growth in order to quantify the influence of technological change on16
variations in output per head, together with the influence of capital
accumulation per head. He assumed constant returns to scale and competitive
markets. In the case of neutral technological change the production function
runs as Y = AtF(K,L), which is differentiated totally with respect to time. After
dividing the result by Y, the growth equation is Y°/Y = A°/A +
A(¶F)/(¶K)*(K°)/(Y) + A(¶F)/(¶L)*(L°)/(Y). Given the relative shares of factors
of production wi = (¶Y/¶i)(i/Y) with i being K or L, Solow derived the equation
which would become a famous one:
Yº/Y = Aº/A + wKKº/K + wLLº/L,          (5)
with the growth rate of output, decomposed in the growth rates of technology,
capital and labour respectively (the latter two multiplied with their relative
shares in output, wK and wL). With constant returns to scale, implying wL = 1 -
wK, it runs in intensive form as
yº/y = Aº/A + wKkº/k.          (6)
The term Aº/A is the so called Solow residual. More formally, it expresses
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth, defined as the growth rate in output
minus the relative share of capital in output multiplied by the growth rate of
capital per worker. Solow (1957) labels this term ‘technical change’, but
recognized that it could contain other influences such as measurement errors.
Furthermore, other inputs than pure technological change could account
partially for growth of output, as Solow states that “any kind of shift in the
production function” is possible, such as “slowdowns, speed-ups,
improvements in the education of the labor force, and all sort of things” (p.
402).
If in equation (6) the capital-labour ratio increases, output can grow
without any technological change. But the study of Solow showed that
technological change plays a very important role. One of the conclusions
Solow derived from the empirical application to American data is that
technical change is neutral in that shifts of the production function did not
change the marginal rates of substitution. The rate of technological change
varies between 1 and 2 per cent per year. The doubling of output during the
interval is for 80 per cent attributable to technology and for 20 per cent to the
accumulation of capital. Hence, despite of the simplifying assumptions in
equation (6), it can be shown that growth of labour or capital can account only
for a very small fraction of output growth, leaving a substantial part of output
growth unexplained (Choi, 1983).
This residual may contain technological change, but unless this factor
is endogenized, one cannot measure its relative impact compared to other17
changes. In any case, Schumpeter (1934) and many others seemed to be right
in considering improvements in technology as a major force behind sustained
economic growth. This conclusion however changed already when
economists like Phelps (1963) assumed technological progress to be
embodied in capital. Solow (1962) himself developed a vintage model in
which all technological progress was embodied in equipment.
2.4 Convergence
So far the steady state properties of the model have been described. But what
happens in the transition period to steady state? These transition dynamics are
more interesting, because they bring the main differences between the
standard neo-classical model and the modern endogenous theory.
If the Inada conditions are satisfied and a balanced growth path exists,
then the long-run growth rate is neither dependent on s nor on the form of the
production function. This seems to be a paradox, because savings must
generate investments, and new investments lead to a higher growth rate.
Suppose, however, that the savings rate is exogeneously given in
accumulation equation (2). Figure 1, now with technological progress, is
altered to figure 2 for convenience, following Sala-i-Martin (1990).
Depreciation is still assumed to be zero.
n+x
sf(k’)/k’
k’0 k’ 1 k’*
Figure 2. Transitional dynamics of the Solow model with technological
                change
Suppose k’* prevails and suddenly the savings rate s increases (by some
exogenous cause). The price mechanism provides the smooth adjustment of
the variables to a new steady state. If s increases, then the growth rate of the18
capital stock is larger than that of labour (in effective units). The sf(k’)/k’
curve in figure 2 will shift to the right and nothing will happen with the n+x
line. If the technological level remains the same, more labour will be
demanded and the wage-profit ratio increases. Firms will choose to use more
capital and k’=K/AtL increases. The growth rate of capital in effective units
k’°/k’ will immediately increase after the increase in s, but will fall over time
and eventually return to zero or the prevailing steady state growth rate. The
average capital productivity y’ decreases, coupled with a reduction of the
growth rate of K’. This is a difference with the Keynesian models, where K/Y
is constant (section 2.1). The steady state level of capital is permanently
higher in the neo-classical model. The speed of convergence to steady state is
very fast, although simulation studies in the 1960s already found adjustment
periods of more than 45 years (Sato, 1966).
If economies differ only in initial k’, then a poor country with a low k’
will grow faster than a rich country. In figure 2 the initial capital-labour ratios
of a poor and rich country are depicted by k’0 and k’1, respectively. The poor
country has a larger growth rate than the rich country. But when capital
evolves over time, they will both end up with the same steady state value of
k’. This argumentation confirms the convergence hypothesis.
If, however, countries also differ in A, s, n or depreciation and other
parameters, then the resulting steady state values of a poor and rich country
may differ. Their growth rates may differ, too. Then no convergence in the
absolute sense occurs. In order to demonstrate a convergence motion, new
terminology had been introduced: conditional convergence. In this view each
country moves to its own steady state at diminishing growth rates. Figure 3
depicts conditional convergence, where a poor country has initial level of
capital k’0 and a rich country starts at k’1. Their capital stocks will evolve over
time to a steady state, k’*poor for the poor country and k’*rich for the rich
country. The steady state values and growth rates will differ depending on the
parameters mentioned above. If, for instance, the savings rate of the rich
country is higher than that of the poor country, the rich country will grow
faster than the poor one. Absolute convergence does not take place. However,
if these parameters are held constant, then a lower initial level of k’ would lead
to a higher growth rate. If conditional convergence is found in empirical
studies, then diminishing returns to capital must exist, thereby supporting
Solow’s theory. The countries differ only in the stage where they are staying.19
n+x
sf(k’)/k’(poor) sf(k’)/k’(rich)
k’ 0 k’* poor k’ 1 k’* rich
Figure 3. Conditional convergence in the Solow model with technological
                change
Mankiw et al. (1992) showed that conditional convergence occurred within
the neo-classical framework. They extended the model with human capital H,
because the Solow model predicts the direction of variables well, but not their
values (Mankiw et al., 1992, pp. 407-408). The concept of human capital is
developed by among others Schultz (see chapter 4). Human capital includes
education, skills and on-the-job training of workers, while crude labour L
concerns unskilled handicraft. Total labour force can be divided between
crude labour and human capital. In the model of Mankiw et al. (1992) savings
and population growth are exogenous. The estimation results imply a large
role for human capital. They estimate the following production function with
Y being output, K physical capital (such as equipment and machinery), H




1-a-b          (7)
Mankiw et al. concluded that the share in income of each input accounts for at
about one third, a = b = 1-a-b = 1/3. Conditional convergence can take place
because a+b<1. Once the differences in s and n are accounted for,
convergence can be predicted roughly with this augmented model. In contrast
to endogenous growth models, where a+b=1, the model predicts that
countries with similar technologies A, rates of accumulation, and population
growth should converge in income per capita. Mankiw et al. (1992) estimate a
rate of 2% per year, so that the adjustment period lasts for 25 to 35 years,
before the growth differences are reduced.20
Grossman and Helpman (1994) did not believe that the model of
Mankiw et al. (1992) is a plausible theory for convergence between countries.
The results of the estimations are very sensitive to the choice of countries. The
large differences in savings and population growth between poor and rich
countries explain more of the differentials than the factor human capital, so
that the augmenting of H to the Solow model explains little. Furthermore,
Romer (1994) argues that the model of Mankiw et al. (1992) inadequately
describes the differences in the richness in technology among countries. No
analysis can be made of the production and diffusion of technological
knowledge and information, because A is the same for all countries.
2.5 Deficiencies of the Solow model
The Solow model predicts that the steady state level of income depends on the
propensity to save and on the growth rate of population. The steady state
growth rate of income per capita depends only on the rate of technological
progress. Furthermore, the marginal product of capital is constant, while the
marginal product of labour grows at the rate of technological progress.
Another conclusion of the model is the constancy of the capital-output ratio,
which is valid if the economy is near its steady state. However, the result that
the long run steady state is independent of the initial conditions is not
supported by evidence (Mankiw, 1995). This is the convergence problem,
which is tackled by Mankiw et al. (1992) and other economists who construct
endogenous models.
New inputs, like human capital, had to be introduced in the Solow
model if it has to be able to explain the magnitude of growth differentials
between countries. In the sources-of-growth analyses by Denison (1967) and
others such factors have always been considered as important to understand
the developments in economic growth (see chapter 4). They introduce factors
like human capital, economies of scale and macroeconomic determinants.
Furthermore, conditional convergence as it takes place in reality might be
predicted by an augmented Solow model, as the model of Mankiw et al.
(1992) did. However, countries converge more slowly than the standard
model predicts. Moreover, growth regressions are very sensitive to the choice
of countries or the period that is considered (see section 4.4). Finally, the size
of the actual differences between the rates of return to capital among countries
cannot be predicted correctly. The elasticity of substitution between capital
and labour in the production function plays a key role. In fact, this elasticity
depends on technology and on the ability to move resources among
industries. The elasticity should be very high to explain the differences
between the rates of return on capital (Mankiw, 1995).21
Solow himself recognized that his model can be criticized with respect
to important elements like the assumption of perfect competition,
homogeneity of the production function, neutrality of technological change
and the labelling of the residual just as ‘technical change’. He saw possibilities
to incorporate monopolistic competition in his model. Furthermore, imposing
Inada conditions were necessary (although not sufficient) to ensure a
convergence to the steady state. If these conditions are not valid, then growth
rates are not constant. But the major deficiency of the Solow model is that the
determinants of technological progress are left unexplained. Therefore, the
following wave of economic research was directed mainly at the systematic
explanation of technological change within the model. Some economists used
technological indicators based on R&D and patent data. Recent growth
models developed by among others Romer (1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991) approach an explanation of technological changes within the
framework (chapter 3).
Endogenizing the savings rate in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK)
model (1965) or in an OverLapping Generations (OLG) model (Samuelson,
1958, Diamond, 1965), described in Appendix A, is important to analyse
transition dynamics, but this of course does not solve the problem of how to
endogenize technological change (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, p. 25). By
abstracting from household behaviour one can focus on technological
progress, capital accumulation and population growth. In his 1994 article
Solow argued that endogenizing technological progress within a growth
model will be the most promising way to explain output growth. Of course,
other parameters like population growth can be endogenized, although
technological progress is the theme of this survey. In the next chapter the
modern endogenous growth theories, which try to tackle the problems of the
standard neo-classical model, are discussed.22
3 Endogenous growth theory
3.1 Introduction
After the promising start with the Solow model the interest for neoclassical
growth theory declined in the 1970s, among other things as a result of
vanishing steady growth that contrasted the Solow model. In the 1960s
unemployment and inflation showed a trade-off, depicted in the Phillips-
curve. In the subsequent decade, in which the oil crises hampered economic
growth, the validity of the Phillips-curve was questioned. The attention of
many scholars turned to short-term issues like the explanation of the real
business cycle under rational expectations. Moreover, the Cambridge-
Cambridge controversy on the existence of the aggregate production function
had brought its own doubts on the Solow type production function, which
could not be answered in a satisfactory way by the neoclassicals (Blaug, 1978,
pp. 487-488). Practically, the lack of data and their inaccurateness made it
difficult to find empirical evidence that might confirm the insights of the
Solow type model. Finally, the Solow model showed important deficiencies,
sketched in section 2.5, of which the exogeneity of the technological factor
was the main problem. In the 1960s and 1970s the neoclassical analyses of
economic growth became very technical and few empirical studies supported
these analyses. The vintage models of Salter (1960) and Solow (1962), which
distinguished embodied and disembodied technological progress, did not
receive much attention. According to empirical scholars like Maddison
(chapter 4), this was a failure of the neo-classical school.
Since the mid-1980s some economists regained interest in studying
the problem of long-term growth, recognising that determinants of growth
were not fully discovered yet and that convergence, predicted by the Solow
type models, had not taken place. Furthermore, to understand the
determinants of growth, deficiencies of the old models had to be removed: the
apparently inexplicable non-decreasing per capita growth and the exogeneity
of technological progress. In addition, more data about growth became
available, so empirical testing of the theory became more appealing. These
data were compiled by, among others, Denison (1967), Maddison (1972) and
Summers and Heston (1984). However, the work of these empirical scholars
was considered by various neo-classicals as data assembling instead of a
profound analysis of economic growth. Only recently the neo-classicals pay
more attention to the insights of growth accountants and other empiricists
(chapter 4). The analyses of the empirical economists are founded on
observation of the reality, by gathering data and trying to induce specific
patterns.23
Among others Mankiw et al. (1992) tackled the convergence problem
within the Solow framework and tried to prove that the Solow model is
applicable, if it is augmented with human capital (chapter 2). In addition,
alternatives to the Solow model were already developed after 1985. One of
the features of the modern growth models is that a change in the propensity to
save influences the long-run growth rate. An example of such a growth model
is the AK model constructed by Rebelo (1991), discussed in section 3.2. The
assumptions of this model, however, are very restrictive and have a weak link
to reality. Other models account for economies of scale: the spillover models
and the models which incorporate monopolistic competition (section 3.3). The
spillover model is studied by, among others, Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).
However, their models captured only a part of the problem. The rejection of
the perfect competition assumption was stimulated by new theories about
monopolistic competition, developed by for example Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Growth models with an R&D sector were constructed by growth theorists like
Romer (1990). In these R&D models monopoly power was essential for the
firms producing intermediate capital goods and technological change is
endogenized.
Meanwhile, alternatives to the modern neoclassical models have been
developed in heterodox economics. For instance, the theory of Scott
(1989,1990) does not distinguish between investment and technological
change or innovation. Scott based his ideas on the technological progress
function (TPF) of Kaldor (1961) and Robinson (1965). The TPF exhibits a
nonlinear relationship between productivity growth and technological change.
In neoclassical theory a shift of the aggregate production function reflects an
innovation. Both functions lead to the same conclusion, namely that balanced
growth is possible. Scott (1989) extended Kaldor’s model. The TPF is also
dependent on the propensity to invest i. A change in investments which leads
to innovations will generate new investments. A high i indicates a strong
tendency to technological change, by which the TPF moves outwards and
thus generates a higher growth rate of output.
Solow agreed with Kaldor and Robinson that the neoclassical
aggregate production function and the measurement of capital as done by
neoclassicals could be rejected on theoretical grounds. However, according to
Solow they could not provide a satisfactory alternative.
Another approach, which has close links with some empirical studies
discussed in chapter 4, is the evolutionary economic theory. Nelson and
Winter (1982), Dosi et al. (1990) and Verspagen (1991) study technological
change within this framework. A common feature of all these models with the
neo-classical models is the recognition of role of government policy, which
can affect the growth rate of productivity within the models.24
3.2 Constant returns growth models
The most direct approach to endogenize growth is to develop a model with
reproducible capital goods, which produce without the help of
nonreproducible factors available in fixed supply (Van de Klundert and
Smulders, 1992). In the 1980s models were developed in which the
production function exhibits Constant Returns to Inputs that can be
Accumulated (CRIA). A simple model is the AK model of Rebelo (1991). In
this model, the aggregate production function had the form Y = AK, where Y
reflected output, A technology and K (physical) capital. A standard Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to both factors of





(1-a).  The share of capital a in production was equal to one in
the AK model and the role of crude labour (and land) was ignored. This
followed the view (often implicitly underlying historical accounts), that
nonreproducible factors are not a key variable in long run growth (Rebelo,
1991, p. 518). The AK model can be considered as a very rudimentary basis
on which other endogenous models can be extended (section 3.3).
In the Solow model diminishing returns to capital lead to a zero long
run growth rate. The AK model was characterized by constant returns to
capital. According to Solow (1994) the AK model was partly a return to the
Harrod-Domar ideas. The marginal productivity of capital was namely also
constant in the Harrod-Domar model. But, in contrast to the Harrod-Domar
model, labour supply was no bottleneck in the AK model. A CRIA model is
called endogenous, because it generates a positive long-run rate of growth
thanks to the constant returns.
The solution to the AK problem is placed in an infinite horizon
optimizing framework to be able to compare it with that of R&D models (see
Appendix A). In the R&D models the allocation of resources between
different sectors and the intertemporal choice of consumption interact (see
section 3.3). Furthermore, savings have a long run impact in an endogenous
growth model, so the decisions of individual households about savings are
important for the outcomes. However, within the AK model there is no link
between differences in incomes per capita and the returns to capital.
The Cobb Douglas production function in the AK model in per capita
terms runs as y = Ak. In an infinite horizon optimizing framework (following
the approach in Appendix A) a CIES utility function is assumed and a
Hamiltonian and first order conditions for steady state growth are derived. In
the following conditions for consumption growth (1) and the accumulation
equation (2) (without depreciation and with zero population growth), gc is the
growth rate of consumption and s the intertemporal elasticity of substitution25
of consumption, which is constant by assumption of a CIES utility function. A
is the state of technology and r the discount rate, reflecting the impatience of
generations to consume.
gc =  s
 -1(A - r)               (1)
and
k° = Ak - c.          (2)
Consumption, capital and output grow at the same rate (A - r)/s. No
transitional dynamics take place in this model, because the growth rates of k
and y are constant and equal to that of c. The growth rate depends on savings
and technology. Savings are taken exogenously (the discount rate and
substitution elasticity being given).
Solow (1994) argued that the intertemporal optimizing model does not
contribute any essential change to growth theory in general. Instead, the
assumption of constant returns was important. The AK model was not robust,
because no satisfactory evidence existed on the assumption of constant
returns. Furthermore, A was still unexplained.
3.3 Increasing r eturns growth models
If the CRIA model (a=1) is extended with nonreproducible inputs like (raw)
labor (b>0), then a model evolves with increasing returns to scale (IRS):
a+b>0 (Sala-i-Martin, 1990). A crucial assumption in those models, n=0, is
made to avoid a forever growing growth rate of capital per effective unit of
labour gk’. The problem with IRS models is that no general equilibrium will
result, because the increasing returns imply unlimited profits to production.
Various methods were developed to solve this problem, under which the
incorporation of spillovers and the rejection of the perfect competition
assumption. Externality or spillover models are of the Marshallian type, with
increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level but constant returns to scale
at the firm level. Spillovers emerge from R&D, education or study,
experimentation and learning by doing. The model without perfect
competition has Chamberlinian monopolistic elements.
Examples of  the spillover model are Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986).
In those models learning effects appeared in production. There was a general
pool of knowledge in society, which was taken as given by the individual
entrepreneur. Mankiw (1995) argued that this was a model of capital with
externalities, where the accumulation of capital included the accumulation of
knowledge. Lucas (1988) also introduced externalities from human capital
accumulation or education. Other models took into account monopoly power26
in the intermediate goods sector, so an incentive to research and development
was preserved in the long run (Romer, 1990). In those models the
accumulation of knowledge was no unintentional by-product, like in the
Arrovian models. In the Lucas model a separate sector for education existed,
but Lucas neglected the fact that human capital had a non-rival element which
generated externalities. In Lucas’ model education was tied to physical bodies.
Growth models developed after 1990 began to combine the elements
of invention and learning by doing into models with economic uncertainty,
variety and creative destruction. Such models contain Schumpeterian ideas
and are called Schumpeterian models. They are constructed by among others
Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1996), Caballero and Jaffe (1993), Coe and
Helpman (1993), Young (1993a, 1993b), Jaffe et al. (1993). The estimation
results of some of these models are discussed in section 4.6.27
Learning by doing and education
Arrow (1962) constructed one of the first models that ascribed technical
change to experience effects. His concept of ‘learning by doing’ meant that
workers learn by experience in production. Learning was not just a repetition
of actions in production, but also a steadily evolving pool of experience.
Experience could be measured by investment because new equipment
changed the environment, “so that learning is taking place with continually
new stimuli” (Arrow, 1962, p. 157). Investment influenced production via
learning in three ways: via capital accumulation, in embodiment of the latest
technological advances, and by stimulating innovations. The incentive to
innovate was not compensated by the market, because the knowledge which
resulted from innovation was a public good. Therefore innovation generated
externalities, which resulted in a divergence between social and private
returns, causing inefficiencies. Romer (1986) had worked out that the
resulting market equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. This was a normative
conclusion, derived within the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans framework.
One of the simplifying assumptions Arrow made in his model was that
of fixed proportions between capital and labor. Furthermore, new capital
goods were more productive than old goods. Depreciation did not matter in
the full employment case for the outcomes of the model. Instead,
obsolescence was the reason that capital goods were retired (p. 159). Firms
were acting according to neoclassical rules and subject to diminishing returns
to capital.
In the Arrow model experience was thus the result of past investment
of all firms. Gross investments, equal to the aggregate capital stock, capture
the externalities and generated a scale effect. This scale effect would not occur
if the externality was captured by the average capital stock. In the latter case
the growth rate of consumption would be independent of total labour supply.
Learning is external to the firm in that its stock of knowledge is related to the
aggregate stock of capital, which increases at zero cost. The total capital stock
kt or experience is the sum of individual capital stocks. It was related to the




where h is the technical parameter for total capital stock (0<h<1). kt is an
input given for the individual firm. This relationship is derived by Arrow
based on experience in the airframe industry. The individual production28
function, in which the state of knowledge At plays a role can be written as
(following Sala-i-Martin, 1990, p. 18)
Yi = F(Ki , Li , k) = Ki
aLi
1-ak
h.          (4)
This form exhibits constant returns to both Ki and Li with a given k
h but
exhibits increasing returns to all inputs. The aggregate production function is
(assuming that the individual firm is representative and aggregating the
outputs of all individual firms):
Y = F(K, L, k) = K
aL
1-ak
h.          (5)
In per capita terms y = k
ak
h. In the accumulation equation (6), consumption
per capita is represented by c (n = 0 and d=0):
k° = k
ak
h - c.          (6)
After deriving the first order conditions from the Hamiltonian, the growth rate
of consumption is a function of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution s,
the capital-labour ratio k, aggregate labour supply L, the individual discount
rate r and  the technical parameters a en h. The growth rate is proportional to
the difference between the marginal product of capital  and the individual
discount rate.
gc = s 
-1[ak
-(1-h-a)L
h - r].          (7)
This was a striking result, because countries with a large population
would experience fast growth (Van de Klundert and Smulders, 1992). The
growth rate gc was constant as long as L and k was constant. This result was
implausible according to Romer (1986, p. 1034). Growth is determined by an
exogenous L. Romer (1986) showed how the growth rate is independent of
population growth.
Sala-i-Martin (1990) described the different cases that could result
from this model. The case in which a+h<1 looks like the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model and results in a zero long run growth rate. Hence,
increasing returns by themselves are not enough to generate persistent growth.
Only ‘very increasing returns’ could generate such growth. h has to be so
large that a+h=1. In this case the model is similar to the AK model. However,
in contrast with the AK model, a difference existed between private and social29
returns. A planner would take into account the externality from the general
pool of knowledge, so that
gplanner = s 
-1[(a+h)k
-(1-h-a)L
h - r].          (8)
This implied that the growth rate of the market economy was too low.
Therefore the market outcome was not optimal (Romer, 1986). Romer
assumed that the production function exhibited such increasing returns to
scale. He justified this assumption by quoting empirical studies of Maddison,
Baumol and growth accountants like Kendrick, arguing that the data did not
exclude the possibility of increasing returns. This assumption was also the
difference with the Arrow model, which assumed that the externalities from
knowledge did not compensate for diminishing returns to capital (Romer,
1986, p. 1016).
Sala-i-Martin (1990) concluded that increasing returns to scale were
neither necessary nor sufficient to generate endogenous growth. They were
not necessary, because endogenous growth was possible with constant returns
to scale like in the AK model. In the Romer model there were constant returns
to reproducible inputs. Nor were increasing returns sufficient because it was
possible to have a+h<1. According to Rebelo (1991), increasing returns were
only required if nonreproducible factors were necessary for the production.
Another problem in the Romer model was that the assumption of perfect
competition broke down if technological diffusion would spread over only
gradually. Then monopolistic profits were possible. Not until Romer’s later
research (1990) these monopoly elements were taken into account.
In Lucas’ model (1988) externalities which lead to increasing returns
arised despite the absence of Arrovian learning effects, because labour tends
to migrate across countries. The Lucas model is a kind of AK model, with K
including both physical and human capital. The concept of human capital was
developed by among others Schultz (chapter 4) and Lucas used his ideas. The
Lucas model contained two sectors, namely one for goods and one for
education. In the Arrow model knowledge was generated within one
production sector, whereas in the Lucas model a separate sector for education
existed, where knowledge could be accumulated. Human capital was
accumulated by education and on-the-job training of workers, so that labour
quality increases and the K/Y ratio changes. The K/Y ratio might increase
because more workers would use more sophisticated tools, but it might also
decrease because productivity is higher. Lucas applied Uzawa’s (1965)
assumption that the existing human capital is the only input in the education
sector. No physical capital was involved in the accumulation of human
capital. The allocation of human capital between the sectors was determined
by its relative returns in each sector. In the education sector the return on30
human capital accumulation was higher, so that in this sector its relative role
was larger than that of physical capital.
Although the learning process by individuals was an intentional one in
Lucas’ opinion, knowledge from human capital was rival and excludable,
because it was tied to individual workers. Nonrival knowledge was not taken
into account by Lucas, whereas in the Romer model (1990) nonrivalry was
very important. Furthermore, in the Lucas model learning did not take place in
production as in the Arrow model, but in leisure time. Because leisure time
was assumed to be constant, human capital changed in a fixed proportion to
education in a reaction to changes in output, so returns to human capital
accumulation were nondecreasing.
The production function in this two-sector economy runs as follows:
Y = AK
bH
1-b,          (9)
where H is human capital. H is equal to uhL, where u is the fraction of
nonleisure time, h a measure of the average quality of workers and L the
number of workers. According to Sala-i-Martin (1990) no externalities were
necessary if there were constant returns to all reproducible inputs, but Lucas
postulated externalities in H to reflect the fact that people are more productive
when they are around clever people. If ha is the average human capital stock




j.                    (10)
The human capital accumulation equation is h
° = fh(1-u), reflecting
accumulation of knowledge by studying in leisure time. f is the study
productivity parameter. The assumption that there were non-diminishing
returns to human capital was crucial in the derivation of this accumulation
equation. By solving the Hamiltonian one could derive the growth rates of
consumption, capital and human capital. If no externalities should emerge, the
growth rates would be equal to g=(f-r)/s. In the Rebelo model A
accomplished the role of f. So in the Lucas model the education sector was
the driving force behind growth. The transitional dynamics of the Lucas
model are difficult to derive, but one conclusion was that there was not always
convergence to the steady state. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993) for
instance analysed transition dynamics in a two-sector model of the Lucas type.
Similar to the Romer (1986) model, the market growth rate in the Lucas
(1988) model was less than the growth rate in a command economy.
In contrast to the Arrow (1962) model and the Lucas (1988) model,
Romer (1986) argues that new knowledge is produced by investing in31
research which exhibits diminshing returns. The production of goods from
increased knowledge, however, shows increasing returns. The Romer model
had three key elements: externalities, increasing returns in the production of
output and decreasing returns of new knowledge. These were consistent with
the assumption of perfect competition. In the Romer model, no transitional
dynamics occurred.
The aggregate capital stock is affected in two ways. In the Arrow
(1962) and Sheshinski type models learning effects emerge from the
production function of the individual firm, which has the form yi = f(li , ki , K)
with li the labour supply used by the firm, ki the firm’s capital stock and K the
general stock of capital. The first derivative of yi to ki is larger than zero, the
second derivative is smaller than zero. The aggregate production function
therefore runs as Y=F(L,K), of which the second derivative to K is larger than
zero. In the Romer (1990) (see below), Lucas (1988) and Uzawa (1965)
models the economy is divided in two sectors, one sector for products and one
for knowledge. In this type of models the capital stock is affected via the
accumulation of knowledge.32
Monopolistic competition and R&D
The models of Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) were not really
theories of endogenous technological progress, because technology is not
determined within the models and still is like ‘manna from heaven’. Spillovers
from knowledge and externalities from human capital do help to avoid
diminishing returns to the accumulation of capital, but they are only a part of
the process. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), (broad) capital
accumulation cannot actually be infinite in the long run. Capital will ultimately
exhibit diminishing returns in the long run, because the most productive units
will be used up first, so that its possibilities are eventually exhausted.
Although international growth differentials can be explained with spillover
models, we have to look at another factor which could generate persistent
economic growth, namely knowledge or technological progress itself.
Population growth can also be endogenised, like other parameters such as the
discount rate r and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution s, but we
concentrate on technological change. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) defined
technological progress as the ‘continuing advances in methods of production
and types and qualities of products’ (p. 212) following Grossman and
Helpman (1991). If technological change is endogenous, growth will persist
forever because there are non-decreasing returns in broad capital. In the sense
that there exist economies of scale, the difference with the previously
discussed models is not fundamental. The difference between knowledge and
human capital is that “...knowledge is the quality of society’s textbooks;
human capital is the amount of time that has been spent reading them”
(Mankiw, 1995, p. 298).
A problem in modelling technological progress is that it is difficult to
model how precisely R&D affects production. Furthermore, there is a large
uncertainty surrounding the production of new designs with respect to the
height of pay-offs. Moreover, it is unclear whether a model is plausible in the
choice of technological indicators and their links with productivity growth.
According to Solow (1994) formal growth models had to co-operate with case
studies to determine the plausibility of endogenous growth models. This
possibility is discussed in the conclusion of this literature survey.
In the Arrow model (1962) spillovers from knowledge were a side
product of production and they were not generated intentionally. According to
Romer (1990), the accumulation of knowledge in the Lucas model was also
unintentional. In recent endogenous growth models knowledge is
accumulated intentionally by scientific research and commercial development
in a separate Research & Development (R&D) sector. R&D will evolve new
ideas and designs that can be employed by workers but are not necessarily
tied to them. R&D is used by firms in search for blueprints of new varieties of33
products or higher quality products. This R&D is not directly productive, but
will contribute to the expansion of the frontiers of knowledge. The
accumulation of knowledge will generate growth, which in turn will stimulate
capital accumulation, and not the other way around (Romer, 1990, p. S72).
R&D enters the model in two ways according to Sala-i-Martin (1990).
First, output per capita is a function of all existing varieties or qualities of
capital goods. R&D increases the productivity of other inputs in the
production of manufacturing goods. If there are constant returns to all
varieties of capital goods, the stock of knowledge and output grow at the same
rate. This is the way Romer (1990) introduced the R&D sector. Second, the
spillovers on aggregate stock will reduce costs of R&D. Then constant returns
to R&D are possible, the incentive to innovate remains positive and
knowledge grows forever. It does not matter why firms do R&D. R&D seeks
improvement of quality or discovery of new varieties. Examples of such
models are the studies of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991).
Because of the assumption of perfect competition in the neoclassical
framework, it is difficult to incorporate technological progress in the model.
Technological advances involve the creation of new ideas, which are nonrival
but partially non-excludable and therefore have characteristics of public
goods. Then increasing returns exist, conflicting with the assumption of
perfect competition. In the Arrow (1962) and Lucas (1988) models the
nonrival inputs were completely nonexcludable. The problem in the Romer
(1986) model was the perfect competition assumption. In the other Romer
(1990) model knowledge was nonexcludable for researchers, but the use of
blueprints can be patented. The introduction of new varieties required
imperfect substitution, so that it was profitable for firms to introduce new
varieties and to continue if other competitors enter the market. In the
intermediate goods sector monopoly power was necessary for researchers to
recover their initial expenditure on the design. In this analysis a
Schumpeterian idea returned, namely that of a profit-seeking entrepreneur
generating growth by his purposive activities, which are stimulated by market
imperfections (Romer, 1990, p. S78).
Monopoly power will bring some distortions in the market, so
governments will have a task to create a Pareto optimal long-run growth rate
(Mankiw, 1995).
4 The monopoly profits are earned by the discoverers.
Because imitation is in general cheaper than innovation, the other agents will
                                                 
4  Readers interested in the optimality problem are referred to for instance A. Heertje’s
(1995) article in De Economist,  Observations on technical change and Paretian welfare
economics (Vol. 143:4, November 1995).34
copy the technology and their activities will generate technological diffusion.
This diffusion leads to a form of conditional convergence.
Romer (1990) made three premises. First, technological change was
the driving force of growth. Second, the intentional R&D was responding to
market incentives such as profits. This means that it was at least partially
excludable. Third, technology research generated spillovers in knowledge,
which were used without additional cost. Thus it was nonrival, what implied
that knowledge could be accumulated without bound, whereas human capital
could not be accumulated infinitely. In the Romer economy three sectors
existed, namely for R&D, intermediate goods and final goods. In the R&D
sector the only inputs were human capital and knowledge. In the intermediate
goods sector the knowledge generated from the R&D sector was applied. And
in the final goods sector raw labour, human capital and durables were used as
inputs. Output could be consumed or saved as new capital. For simplicity it
was assumed that population growth is zero and that the total stock of both
human capital and raw labour is fixed.
The Cobb Douglas production function in the final goods sector of the
Romer model is
Y(HY, L, x) = HY
aL
bòx(i)
(1-a-b)di        (11)
where x(i) is a capital good of variety i. The total human capital employed in
the R&D sector is the only input in the accumulation of knowledge:
A° = dHAA           (12)
with d a productivity parameter and HA the human capital used for knowledge
accumulation. According to Romer human capital is the correct measure of
scale, not population. Because equation (11) is linear and does not have
restrictions, unbounded growth is possible. Knowledge enters both the final
goods sector and R&D sector, but in the final goods sector knowledge is
excludable (patented), whereas in the R&D sector it is nonexcludable
(learning effects). This nonexcludability makes it possible to imitate or copy a
new variety in the final goods sector. The intermediate goods sector
maximizes profits, which depend on the demand for durables by the final
goods sector. The initial expenditure on the design are sunk costs. The
resulting monopoly price is a mark-up, determined by the elasticity of
demand, over the marginal cost. The conditions in the final goods sector
determine the monopoly price pM = rh/(1-a-b), where h reflects units of
forgone consumption and r the rate of return on capital. Price discrimination
was not possible for the entrepreneurs in the Romer model. Romer (1990) thus
combined a R&D sector with monopolistic elements together with spillovers35
like those in learning models. This combination was the most promising
development in growth theory according to, among others, Solow (1994). A
model with only R&D generated the same outcome as previous models with
public spending (Barro, 1990), learning-by-doing or human capital models.
As Romer (1990) stated: “There is little doubt that much of the value to
society of any given innovation or discovery is not captured by the inventor,
and any model that missed these spillovers would miss important elements of
the growth process. Yet, it is still the case that private, profit-maximizing
agents make investments in the creation of new knowledge and that they earn
a return on these investments by charging a price for the resulting goods that
is greater than the marginal cost of producing the goods” (p. S89). The
promise lies in the effort to take into account microeconomic elements like
profit-maximizing firms striving for monopoly power by doing knowledge
research, patenting their inventions and borrowing ideas from other firms on
which they can build their knowledge. An R&D model would force
economists to think carefully about technology and knowledge and offer a
broader perspective (Romer, 1995). Moreover, knowledge differences do
exists in the real world because of interfirm differences.
The Romer (1990) model is one of the Schumpeterian models which
are developed recently. These models tried to capture the Schumpeterian
elements of dynamic economic growth and disequilibria into a formal model,
although this remained difficult. Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1996) and Young
(1993a, 1993b) are examples of the new road taken nowadays. Aghion and
Howitt (1992) presented a model which captures the creative destruction
process of Schumpeter. A separate research sector generates endogenous
innovations which intertemporally cause changes in productivity growth.
Different equilibria are possible in this model. The growth rate is dependent
on inventive activity, education, productivity of research and (negatively) on
the rate of time preference. The average growth rate might not be socially
optimal because of conflicting distortionary effects. Growth is hampered by
appropriability and intertemporal spillover effects as discussed in Romer’s
(1990) model, but too much growth is also possible because of a business-
stealing effect in that “researchers do not internalize the destruction of existing
rents created by their innovations” (p. 325), taking the size of innovations as
given. If this size is endogenized, innovations may be too small. Aghion and
Howitt (1992) concluded that some extensions of the model were desirable,
such as bounded technology, so that the size of innovations are required to
fall.
The Aghion and Howitt (1996) model explored a structural aspect of
growth, namely that of competition. Other aspects are likely to be examined
by other scholars, such as the difference between fundamental and secondary
research, business cycles, waves of technological change, and unemployment.36
Competition and growth were inversely related in the recent elementary
Schumpeterian models, while evidence did not support this result. Aghion and
Howitt (1996) therefore extended the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model to
demonstrate that a more competitive market structure can contribute to
growth. In the opinion of Aghion and Howitt (1996), the model provides a
new starting point for further empirical research. The model namely suggested
that “competition in research, as opposed to market competition, is almost
likely to be favourable to growth” (p. 43). Furthermore, in subgroups of the
economy the impact of market competition on growth may be positive.
Young (1993a, 1993b) explored some extensions of the Aghion and
Howitt (1992) model and Aghion and Howitt (1996) also refer to Young. The
Young (1993a) model combined two elements, namely that of invention (like
Romer, 1990, and Grossman and Helpman, 1991) and that of learning by
doing (like Arrow, 1962, and Lucas, 1988). Young assumed that the ability to
learn is ‘bounded’. After introduction of a new technology, the inherent
physical limit on its productivity slows down learning, unless a new
innovation is made (p. 445). Young founded this assumption on historical
evidence, which indicates that pre-industrial economies experienced long-run
technical stagnation. As Crafts (1995b) argued, the role of learning as
opposed to R&D or invention is understated (section 4.6). Historical examples
also support the statement of Young (1993b), that the Schumpeterian model
of creative destruction ‘forgets’ the possibility of new technologies
complementing older ones, which create rents instead of destroying them.
Substitution and complementarity opportunities produce a “stylized life cycle”
(p. 804). The model could generate multiple equilibria.
However, modern growth models have a thin empirical basis. Most
theory based empirical studies started from the Solow type model and tested it
instead of an endogenous model. Growth regressions founded on growth
models were estimated by Barro (1991) and others. The measurement of
technological variables is very difficult, as Griliches (1994) and others argued.
The Solow model had, however, been a good starting point for the extension
of neoclassical growth theory. Recent theories consider factors like education
and research, of which the benefits are of a long run nature. International
technology spillovers and variety of products are also better highlighted
nowadays, among others by Grossman and Helpman (1991). Endogenous
innovation is incorporated within models of creative destruction. But those
‘new’ factors have always been considered as important by empirical scholars,
who emphasise the path-dependency of technological progress and economic
growth. In chapter 4 the empirical studies of Abramovitz (1991), Maddison
(1995), Barro (1991), Griliches (1994) and other scholars will be discussed. In
section 4.6 some results of Schumpeterian models are discussed together with
these empirical studies.37
  The model of Scott (1989) shows an overlap with Arrow’s learning
effects. Scott found ideas of Schmookler (1966), Hirschman (1958) and
Arrow (1962) interesting. Furthermore, in Scott’s opinion “...there is no
reason to suppose that undertaking investment depresses the rate of return to it
at a later date, and all experience suggests that it does not” (1992, p. 625).
Because future is uncertain, investment opportunities are founded on the
present situation. This situation changes because of these investments, so that
new chances are created by them. R&D is just one of the many forms of
investments in Scott’s opinion.38
4 Empirical analyses of technological progress
4.1 Introduction
Standard neo-classical theory and modern endogenous growth theory are
analytical approaches, which try to explain the change in productivity growth
deductively. However, long before the formal theories incorporated aspects
like economies of scale, endogenous change or spillovers from research and
development, economic historians and historically oriented economists
already commented on the importance of those factors and their
interdependency. These scholars observe the actual developments in
productivity growth and technology and induce possible links between
economic variables. This line of research has been strongly supported by the
development of detailed historical national accounts.
Four groups of empirical scholars can be distinguished, although
sharp boundaries cannot be drawn between these groups. The first group
carries out quantitative analyses of technological change in the long run. The
starting point of these analyses is economic history. For example David
(1991), Broadberry (1994a, 1994b) and Crafts (1995a, 1995b) study
technology within this framework. Different technological-gap theorists, such
as Gerschenkron (1962), Rosenberg (1976) and Abramovitz (1986), have
developed ideas about a ‘national innovation system’, the leaders at the
technological frontier, catch-up of the followers, social capabilities and
technological congruence (section 4.2).
In contrast to these scholars, a second group sometimes uses a
production function from growth theory as a basis for growth accounts. In
these accounts, productivity growth is decomposed in components like
accumulation of physical and human capital. Factors which cannot be
measured and measurement errors are left in a residual, referred to as the
Abramovitz or Solow residual. Growth accountants try to reduce the residual
by better measurement of some variables or by adding other possible
influences of productivity growth. Section 4.3 describes the analyses of
among others Denison (1967), Kendrick (1976), Maddison (1991) and
Abramovitz (1993).
Estimating growth equations is another possible way to study the
impact of technological progress. This approach is used by a third group of
scholars like Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992), who constructed
productivity equations with the help of economic theory (section 4.4). Of all
empirical studies the studies within this approach bear most heavily on
economic theory. The final group of empirical economists estimates
technology and technological change by measuring outlays in R&D, patents,39
licenses and other indicators. Schmookler (1966), Griliches (1994) and in the
Netherlands Soete and Verspagen (1991) are good examples. Their work is
discussed in section 4.6, together with other spillover studies. In section 4.5
the gains of a sectoral approach are outlined. This approach is used by various
empirical scholars in all the four groups, among others Van Ark (1996).
4.2 Technological change in the long run
In the opinion of historically oriented economists, technological change is
path-dependent. Abramovitz (1991), for instance, argued that technological
progress is more than just an interaction between the accumulation of physical
and human capital and technology. Technological development is also a
learning and feedback mechanism, which can generate economies of scale
and structural changes. According to various scholars like Gerschenkron
(1962), Kuznets (1965) and Abramovitz (1991), technological progress is
dependent on the specific (historical and national) characteristics of the
environment of firms in which innovations take place. They also make a
distinction between the potential of an economy to innovate and diffuse new
technologies and the realisation of this potential or adaptation of new
technologies.
Countries at the technological frontier try to enhance their technical
efficiency. For those countries invention, innovation and diffusion of
technological knowledge is very important. The frontier countries invest in the
research and development of technological knowledge necessary for the
creation of products. The technological regime at the frontier is the feasible
limit that allows a certain level of output for a given level of inputs (Choi,
1983). Technological progress increases this level of output or improves its
quality with the same level of inputs, or the same output with less inputs.
However, most countries exploit technology systems with an average, lower,
productivity and might use obsolete techniques. The extent in which those
technologies are exploited to increase productivity is more important for these
follower countries.
In the early literature on technological change (Schmookler, 1966,
Mansfield, 1968) a distinction is made between technological and technical
change. The former type of change concerns invention, know why things
work as they do (discovery), while the latter involves innovation, know how
to make things work (application). Invention and innovation are two
subsequent stages influencing the technological frontier. After the discovery
and introduction of a new technology further improvements can be made and
costs reduced through learning effects. Then other firms, foreign or domestic,
can adopt the technology more easily. In this phase the new technology is
diffused and the productivity levels in an economy using the average practice40
are affected. No sharp boundaries can be drawn between the three stages of
invention, innovation and diffusion because of feedback mechanisms. The
recent literature on technology considers invention as a part of innovation and
both are considered as elements in one process together with diffusion
(OECD, 1991). Innovation and diffusion can both be determined by demand
and supply factors. Schmookler (1966) was convinced that demand
determines the application of new techniques, whereas others think supply
forces stronger.
Diffusion of technologies within or among countries can enhance
productivity growth. In nineteenth century Britain the technological path was
determined by learning effects from increasing returns and exogenous
changes in the environment, together with economies of scale. International
spillovers were less important to the UK in the previous century (Crafts,
1995a). At that time clusters of macro-inventions, which were exogenous and
unpredictable, led to chain reactions of micro improvements in the long run.
Rosenberg (1976) stated that the cumulative effects of minor technological
changes upon cost reduction were larger than effects of major technological
changes. This was in sharp contrast with the theory of Schumpeter, who
emphasized the major breaks.
The British developments stood in contrast to the systematic R&D and
applied scientific research which are predominant nowadays, such as
happened in the US from the 1880s on. The US benefited from a cluster of
innovations in the 1880s, which was an opportunity to reap economies of
scale in a resource and capital intensive mass-production system, used in
newly organized giant firms. These developments enabled the US to establish
the private organization and public infrastructure necessary to operate in
emerging science-based industries, although the US was not the leader in the
scientific area at the beginning of the twentieth century (Nelson and Wright,
1992).
Rosenberg (1982) argued that improvements in technology will not
necessarily be incorporated in production immediately, but will be adopted
with a lag. David (1991) shares Rosenberg’s opinion in his own story on
dynamos and computers. This was the only way to solve the so called
productivity paradox. This paradox refers to the many innovations in the
information technology in the 1980s and 1990s, which do not seem to have
been translated in accelerated productivity growth (OECD, 1992). There
seems to be a less strong link between technological progress and productivity
growth than was assumed before. Several theories were developed on the
solution of the paradox. Some scholars, such as Griliches (1994), imputed the
paradox to the measurement problem of data of the service sector, where most
of the productivity increase had occurred.41
However, according to scholars like David (1991) the link between
technological progress and productivity does exist, but diffusion of
technological knowledge occurs only slowly. In Salter’s (1960) opinion,
diffusion is slow due to costs arising from uncertainty and fixed costs
surrounding the adoption of an innovation, vintage effects and the
heterogeneity of firms and markets, which complicate the copying of one’s
another technology. These costs arise because diffusion is more than imitating
a new production method or new variety or better quality of a product. It also
involves an economic incentive to adopt it, which is an innovation by itself. In
the diffusion process, a treshold level of costs exists where the new and old
technologies are competitive. After passing this level adoption rates of the
new technology may be increasingly sensitive to further improvements.
The economic importance of diffusion stems from the difference
between social and private returns. This difference implies that gaps between
countries in objects (that is, capital goods) and ideas are not closed (Romer,
1993). Countries at the technological frontier are followed by others, which
try to catch up with these leaders by borrowing frontier technologies and
exploit them within their own social environment. To catch up, a backward
country will have to choose a particular technology with specific
characteristics within a specific institutional setting. This choice is made by
firms at a microeconomic level, which affects the macroeconomic character of
a society’s technological path (David, 1975).
A labour intensive technological system will follow another path than
one system which is capital intensive. It is difficult to swith to another
technology, because of information and coordination problems and
technological interrelationships. A chosen technology will thus be deepened
rather than shifted. The path forms an irreversible process which determines
the long-run productivity rates. Although the possibility of imitation or
borrowing allows for catch up growth, the growth rates will differ between
countries. Broadberry (1994b) describes the technological systems of the US,
UK and Germany. The productivity development in the different countries is
given in table 4 of Appendix B. In the nineteenth century the US economy
exhibited a technology system necessary for mass production, namely one
which uses machinery and resources intensively. In contrast, craft production
was often profitable in the UK, that specialized in a skilled-labour intensive
technology. Those technological systems coexisted, as long as they could
adopt new techniques. Innovation elsewhere may undermine the position of
one’s own technology. However, one’s another technology system cannot be
just imitated, because the cumulative or path-dependent character of the
technological progress is specific to the country. So technologies cannot just
be copied by other countries (Fagerberg, 1994).42
Hence, different strategies in technology development are possible, on
the condition that investments are made in specific skills to reap economies of
scale and scope inherent to each technology system (Broadberry, 1994b). The
extent to which a country is able to exploit existing technologies depends on
its social capability and technological congruence (Abramovitz, 1991).
Technological congruence is the extent to which the country can apply the
new technology of the leader to its own circumstances, while technological
competence or social capability determines the absorption and exploitation of
technologies. Both elements determine the society’s potential to catch up. The
realisation or exploitation of growth opportunities is determined by more
factors, such as the speed of technology diffusion, macroeconomic conditions,
structural changes (such as a shift between sectors) and the institutional
framework. As Gerschenkron (1962) argued,  the process of overcoming “the
lack of preconditions for economic progress” is stimulated by the existence of
“advantages of backwardness” or a catch-up opportunity, but this is a costly
process (p. 51) because it requires an rearrangement of country-specific
institutions.
Fogel (1964) made a provocative argument with respect to the path an
economy can follow. He stated that railways in the American states in the
nineteenth century were not necessary to take a lead in agricultural
production. Instead, the railways were an embodied technological
development, which was exploited as largely as possible. Disembodied
technological progress was reflected by the fact that cheaper transportation
became possible in the previous century through a cluster of innovations,
whatever form this transportation would take. “...the fact that the condition of
cheap transportation was satisfied by one innovation [railways] rather than
another [water, wagons] determined, not whether growth would take place,
but which of many possible growth paths would be followed” (p. 237). A
certain chance element plays a role, but just within the technological
developments.
Technological progress is embedded in the country-specific
organizational structure of economy, which consists of firms, networks and
institutions. The firms, which differ mutually in the capability to innovate,
learn and adopt, play a key role in the choice of the technological path
(Chandler, 1990). Human capital accumulated in those firms is very
important, too. Furthermore, the institutional environment of the firms affects
their performance. The use of average practice technologies instead of frontier
technologies is caused by institutional barriers. “[L...]ocation on a
technological trajectory may be less important than the efficiency with which
the advantages of that location are pursued. This, in turn, depends on
institutional features (broadly defined) that may be more or less appropriate43
for a given pattern of specialization” (Ergas, 1987, p. 233). It is difficult,
however, to quantify the effects of institutional aspects.
In short, a follower country has the possibility to catch up because of
the possibility to borrow technology cheaply from the leader and because of
greater opportunities than the leader to change institutions. The possibility to
catch up provides a potential advantage, which is realised, depending on the
social capability and technological congruence. Human capital, international
trade, market structure, social stability and government policy and other
factors interact and change over time, affecting the productivity growth rate.
The path-dependency of technological change is essential in the explanation
of productivity growth differentials between countries.44
4.3 Growth accounting
Exploring sources of growth
Growth accounting is an analysis of the decomposition of the growth rate of a
dependent variable such as GDP per hour worked in different possible
‘sources’ of growth. Such sources are among other things changes in the input
of physical and human capital, scale effects, foreign trade and the institutional
environment. A residual remains after accounting for these factors.
Abramovitz (1956) calls this part a “measure of our ignorance” (Abramovitz,
1991, p. 133). In the successive studies from the 1950s on, the residual is
reduced from 90 per cent to even less than 40 per cent, but it still accounts for
a large part of the economic growth. Technological progress is usually
assumed to account for a large part of the residual, in addition to factors which
could not be measured and measurement errors. Growth accounting is not a
theory of growth, because it fails to explain how the sources relate to growth
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, p. 352).
Tinbergen (1942) constructed the first growth accounts for several
countries, with labour and capital as the driving forces behind growth. He
referred to the unexplained residual as ‘total factor productivity’ growth. At
that time, availability of accurate data was still a great problem. In the US the
NBER did much pioneering work in growth accounting. In 1957, Solow
constructed the model that directed the attention of many neo-classical
economists to technological change. They emphasized the role of physical
capital and investment and the long run adaptive capacity of the economy,
whereas for Keynesians like Kaldor (1961) demand aspects like factor and
commodity prices also remained essential. In the 1950s various scholars
began to measure changes in quantity and quality of capital and labour.
Fabricant (1954), Abramovitz (1956), and Kendrick (1956) are a few of the
most influential authors in this area. Some growth accountants, such as
Jorgenson (1995), followed the neo-classical ideas strictly, whereas others
used a more eclectic approach with national and sectoral data.
Abramovitz (1956) included new factors like education and research
as inputs in his growth accounts. However, according to Maddison (1995),
Solow’s paper (1957) was more influential. In this paper the residual is
assumed to represent technological change, although other factors also played
a role in this residual. Solow assumed that technological progress is fully
disembodied, so that all technological change appears in a shift of the
production function. Later Solow (1962) developed a vintage model with an
effective stock of capital in which all technological progress is embodied. In
his 1957 paper, Solow measured the residual with time series of Goldsmith for45
the US. Table 1 summarizes his results and compares them to other studies,
which I will discuss below. In Appendix B detailed accounts are presented for
interested readers. Solow concluded that technological change is uncorrelated
with the capital-labour ratio, so that over this46
Table 1.  Growth accounts of the US











































































































Source: Appendix B. After accounting for the contribution from capital and labour in
quantitative and qualitative terms, the growth rate of output can be decomposed in the
growth rate of total factor input and total factor productivity. The latter is decomposed
by Denison (1967) and Maddison (1991) in additional sources like foreign trade effects,
economies of scale and demand fluctuations. After this decomposition a residual remains
unexplained (line 10). In the other three studies no other sources of growth are added, so
the residual remains equal to TFP. Furthermore, Denison (1967) adjusted total factor
input for land (-0.03 per cent per year). Maddison’s data (1991, table 5.3 and 5.10) are
weighted with  0.7 for total labour input (growth rate 1.67), 0.23 for non-residential
capital (growth rate 5.01) and 0.07 for residential capital stock (growth rate 3.29).47
period, shifts in the aggregate production function can be considered as
neutral. Technical change accelerated after 1929. Over forty years technology
changed with 1.5 per cent per year on the average. Furthermore, labour
productivity, real GNP per man hour, is doubled from $0.623 to $1.275. Total
factor productivity or the change in technology A°/A increased with 80 per
cent from 1,000 to 1,809 (indexed) over the same period. Dividing the 1949
value for output per man hour, $1.275, by 1.809 results in GNP per man hour
net of technical change: $0.705. Thus, 12.5 per cent of the increase is thanks
to the capital accumulation per man hour, while 87.5 per cent comes from
technical change (see table B.5). Solow (1957, p. 412, fn. 5) refers to
Abramovitz (1956) and emphasises measurement problems like that of
improvement in the quality of the labour input, which must be a result of real
capital formation of some kind. A lot of what appears to be part of the shifts in
the production function represents the accumulation in real capital. An
important step forward in growth accounting, in particular on an
internationally comparative basis, was made by Denison (1962, 1967).
Denison introduced various new ‘sources’, which were considered as
important by contemporary scholars, but which were not included in growth
accounts yet. The basis of Denison’s work was formed by the theories of
Solow (1956, 1957, 1962) and Schultz (1961). The latter developed the
concept of human capital, like Mincer and Becker. Denison (1967)
constructed growth accounts for the US (see table 1) and some European
countries. After deducting the contribution of the inputs capital, labour and
land and adjusting for changes in their quality, total factor productivity (TFP)
growth accounted for 64 per cent of the growth rate in 1950-1962. Denison
added other determinants of growth like improved allocation in resources (13
per cent of TFP) and economies of scale (16 per cent of TFP). Two ways were
thus open for growth accountants to reduce the residual: by adding new
sources of growth and by accounting for embodiment of technological change
in adjusting for quality, composition and the like. However, 34 per cent still
remained unexplained as a residual in Denison’s account of the US.
According to Denison advances in knowledge are difficult to measure
directly. After accounting for all possible measurable sources, the residual
must therefore contain advances of knowledge (general efficiency) and the
change in the lag in the application of knowledge, together with measurement
errors and omissions. For instance, the residuals include the “interaction”
between the contribution of factors included in the residual and other factors
such as the technological knowledge which is not embodied in capital. The
interaction is however “too trifling ... to impair comparisons” (p. 281, fn. 8).
Table B.7 in Appendix B presents the contribution of the residual in different
countries. Denison’s estimates of the residual value it less than 50 per cent,
even less than 40 per cent of the growth in national income per person48
employed. Measured as a percentage of output per unit of input, the residual
is somewhat higher.
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) tried to reduce the residual to zero by
measuring capital and labour in efficiency units (Choi, 1983), which capture
improvements in quality. Jorgenson and Griliches stated that the economic
theory underlying the measurement of total factor productivity has not been
fully exploited. Furthermore, they alleged that Denison and other growth
accountants had made measurement errors, which gave serious biases.
Jorgenson and Griliches eliminated those ‘errors’ in aggregation, investment
good prices, relative utilization, aggregation of capital services and
aggregation of labour services (Jorgenson, 1995, table 3.9,  p. 84).
Jorgenson and Griliches assumed perfect competition and employed a
constant returns production function. Similar to Denison, technical change
equaled a shift of the production function and the growth rate of total factor
productivity was the difference between the growth rates of real product and
that of real factor input. In measuring capital, Jorgenson and Griliches used
the flow prices of capital services, not the asset prices of the capital stock.
Their estimation resulted in an average annual growth rate in total output of
3.59 (originally 3.49) in the US private domestic economy in the period 1945-
1965 and a growth rate of 3.47 (originally 1.83) for total input. The residual
decreased to 0.10 a year, i.e. 3 per cent of growth rate in output, in contrast to
the original estimate of 1.60, i.e. 46 per cent. Jorgenson and Griliches
concluded that growth in real factor input rather than growth in total factor
productivity was the predominant source of growth in real product.
The publication of this 1967 paper was the start of an intensive debate
with Denison in economic journals. This discussion led Jorgenson and
Griliches to conclude that they had exaggerated in reducing the residual to
zero, although they still disagreed with Denison in the way of measuring
physical capital and believed that one has to refine and extend the growth
accounts to minimize the residual: “The resulting estimates of growth in total
factor productivity are closer to Denison’s estimates than our original ones,
but still significantly lower. .... [H]owever, ... : Growth in total input is a major
rather than a minor source in the growth of national output” (Jorgenson, 1995,
p. 102). According to Jorgenson and Griliches (1972) real product increased
in the period 1950-1962 with an average annual rate of growth of 3.47 and
real factor input with a rate of 2.42. Total factor productivity increased with
1.03, i.e. 30 per cent of the total output growth rate (see table 1). Above all,
Jorgenson constructed sectoral accounts and his refinements of these accounts
remain of great value, as becomes clear from the collected papers of
Jorgenson (1995). Denison only considered total economy. In section 4.5
ideas underlying the sectoral approach will be described.49
Kendrick (1976, 1993) and Maddison (1972 to 1995) provided more
detailed growth accounts following Abramovitz, Solow, Denison and
Jorgenson and Griliches. Kendrick (1976) added R&D to the traditional inputs
physical capital, human capital and inventories. Like Jorgenson he
disaggregated his data to the sectoral level. His estimations appeared to
confirm the neo-classical view of a constant capital-output ratio. Tables 1, B.8
and B.9 demonstrate his results. Physical and human tangible and intangible
capital contributed for a large part to the national growth. Table B.9 shows
that the residual decreased to between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the
growth rate. Human capital (including R&D) and nonhuman capital
contributed to growth with 41 to 45 per cent and 37 to 42 per cent
respectively (Kendrick, 1993). His conclusion is that the including real
intangible capital increases the contribution of real human capital to growth.
The residual is reduced because improvements in quality of labour are
accounted for by human capital. In short, according to Kendrick total factor
productivity growth is not zero although the largest part of growth comes from
broad (both physical and human) capital accumulation.
Maddison (1995) composed time series on GDP, population, labour,
capital and exports for 56 countries. Summers and Heston (1991), the OECD,
the World Bank, the IMF and other institutions also gathered figures on
among other things consumption expenditures and saving rates and used a
sample of countries, though not for such a long period as Maddison. The
growth accounts in Maddison’s 1991 book, in which the growth accounts
cover 16 countries, showed his efforts to refine the measurements. Table B.10
describes the different forces behind growth according to Maddison and
shows that the residual was reduced to less than 30 per cent for the US (see
also tables 1 and B.11). In the period 1973-1987 the explained part even rises
to 94 per cent of the total growth in GDP. On average, 77 per cent of the total
growth in GDP can be explained. Growth accounts are made not only for
advanced countries, but also for developing countries, by among others
Hofman, Elias and Langoni on Latin American countries and accounts for
among others Korea. Those are not discussed in this literature survey, which
concentrates on developed countries.
The revival in growth theory, stimulated by articles of Baumol (1986),
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), was of great importance because the greater
explanatory power allocated to technical change was not “tackled very
seriously” by growth accountants. But (country-specific) institutional factors
remain difficult to model and difficult to test. Furthermore, policies are
difficult to distinguish from institutions. Maddison (1995) distinguishes
between proximate and ultimate sources of growth (p. 50). Institutions,
political and economic order, policies and technological diffusion from
leaders to followers are ultimate sources. Growth accounts only estimate the50
proximate sources: land, capital, labour and their productivity changes,
eventually added with other sources like foreign trade effects. The residual
accounts for disembodied technological progress.
In his recent book Maddison (1995) argued that although there is
good progress in growth accounting, these often cover only the twentieth
century and are not yet constructed for many countries. Exceptions are, for
example, Abramovitz (1993) and David (of which the figures are gathered in
Abramovitz, 1993) for the US from 1800 onwards. Maddison (1995)
constructed figures on GDP and population which go back to 1820 for
advanced countries. In such a setting the long run developments and their
nature in different countries become clear. Those figures will provide a new
starting point for future research on long periods and for extensions to more
countries. In table B.12 the computations of Maddison (1995) for the US are
presented.
From the first growth accounts onwards, Abramovitz and David
commented at several occasions on developments in growth accounting with
various case studies. In Abramovitz’ paper (1993) historical data constructed
by David are given. Table B.13 presents his results. In this way Abramovitz
focused attention on long-run developments, free from temporary fluctuations,
political changes and measurement errors. Table B.13 shows the relative
importance of capital accumulation in the nineteenth century. The same
development can be observed from Maddison’s figures (table B.12). In the
twentieth century, TFP growth gains more importance, although its share in
GDP growth seems to decline after 1966 (or 1973 in Maddison’s account,
table B.12). In the nineteenth century technological progress appears to be
heavily embodied in physical capital, while in the twentieth century the
emphasis shifted to human or intangible capital (Abramovitz, 1993).
The growth accounts can be modified to cope with theoretical
assumptions, together with the endogenizing of technological change. “The
growth accounting approach can also be used to test the findings of
econometricians who use the regression approach to causal analysis”
(Maddison, 1995, p. 13). If, for instance, a new factor is added to the growth
accounts which is used in a regression, the growth accounts could make
obvious whether growth is ‘overexplained’ or not. Overexplanation can occur
because of the interaction between the different variables. Then restrictions
have to be imposed on the coefficients or the structure of the model has to be
changed. Jorgenson was also interested in econometric models of economic
growth to give a more analytical role to the sources-of-growth method. In
section 4.4 studies of technological change with the help of regressions, cross
country or time serial, are discussed. These empirical analyses are important in
that they might link the formal endogenous growth theory and the growth51
accounting. Such an integration will be proposed in the conclusion of this
paper.
Limitations of growth accounting
Although growth accounts give insight in the relative impact of different
sources on growth, they have their limitations. The first is the difficulty of
correct measurement and definition of variables. For example, what is
‘capital’? Which data have to be used to measure capital? How have the data
to be deflated? The choice of international Purchasing Power Parities,
weighting of the factors starting from a basis year, and the measurement of
services causes problems. Measurement errors can arise from the lack of
accurate data. Moreover, the impact of some variables on growth can be
lagged in time (OECD, 1991). Griliches (1994) observes data problems in
measuring R&D and patents (see section 4.6). A related problem is the
difficulty to measure the impact of the institutional framework. How to solve
this problem is not clear yet. Furthermore, maybe one has to measure
technology directly, using data on R&D, patents and the like as a proxy for
technological change, in order to gain more insight in its relative influence
(see section 4.6).
Second, growth accounts lack a theoretical basis (Grossman and
Helpman, 1991) and cannot explain the precise relationship between
productivity growth and factors of which it is assumed that they influence
productivity growth. Although accounts cannot identify causal relationships
and assumptions such as the neo-classical production function and weights for
the determinants are imposed, they give insight in the relative influence of
different determinants of productivity growth. Another problem with the
accounts is that because of their aggregative character, national or sectoral,
they cannot uncover the uneven distribution of  technology across countries
or sectors. Nevertheless, a sectoral approach will make the distribution of
productivity changes between internationally competing sectors better known
to us, as will be argued in section 4.5.
Third, the new insights of modern growth theory are not entirely
applied in growth accounts, whereas growth regression acquire all those
results (section 4.4). For instance, the initial conditions of an economy are
important in the race to catch up with technological leaders (Dowrick, 1995).
The role of government policies trying to enhance productivity growth are not
highlighted in the growth accounts. Furthermore, according to Roeger (1995)
the inclusion of an indicator for the market structure, the mark up, appears to
reduce the traditional residual, which now contains not only TFP growth but
also the mark up. Other studies have indicated strong links between exports,52
innovation and economic performance of firms, instead of a strong link
between innovation and R&D.
To summarize, table 2 lists determinants that play a role in the
decomposition of productivity growth. This selection is not exhaustive. One
point of attention is that the relative influence of those sources of growth can
change in time and place. In the nineteenth century for example, physical
capital had a relatively large impact on economic growth, while in the
twentieth century human capital accumulation or education became more
important. Furthermore, the coefficients in the estimated regressions are
sensitive to the choice of the observed countries. If we consider only the
OECD countries, then we will draw different conclusions about the
importance of some factors than if we also include African countries or South
American countries. We will also get other results if we consider sectoral
differences.53
Table 2.  Potential sources of growth
____________________________________________
Proximate sources of growth
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Accumulation of physical capital
Accumulation of human capital and crude labour
Technological change or advances in knowledge
Increased openness
Initial conditions
Endowments (natural resources and energy)
Market structure and resource allocation
Economies of scale
Macroeconomic conditions and fluctuations in demand
Measurement errors and non-measurable factors
____________________________________________




Institutional and structural changes
____________________________________________
4.4 Growth regressions
Cross country and panel studies
Cross country and time series studies can determine the role of explanatory
variables like capital, investment and education or test the prediction of the
standard neoclassical model that conditional convergence will take place.
Until recently most empirical studies did not test endogenous models of
technological change (Pack, 1994). In section 4.6 some recent studies are
discussed. Cross country regressions estimate growth differentials, while panel
studies describe the effects of changes in the characteristics of an economy.
Cross country growth studies based on the Solow models tried to
verify the b-convergence hypothesis. Regressions of the growth rate of real
per capita income or labour productivity on the initial level of the dependent
variable did not confirm this hypothesis. DeLong (1992) argued that the
results may be valid for advanced countries today, but not for the richest
countries in the nineteenth century (Fagerberg, 1994). Later other variables
indicated by endogenous theory and growth accounting studies were taken54
into account. Now the growth regressions test the validity of the catch up
concept and the conditional convergence hypothesis. Examples of cross
country studies are those of Romer (1990), Barro (1991) and Helliwell and
Chung (1992). In most regressions four basic variables are incorporated: a
catch up variable such as the initial level of real per capita income,
investments, population growth and education. Sometimes the latter two
variables are not included together.
           Table 3 presents some results of cross country regressions. Dowrick
and Nguyen (1989) regress the average annual growth rate of real GDP on the
catch-up variable Y1950 (the log of 1950 per capita GDP), the annual growth
rate of population 1950-81 and the average percentage share of gross
investment in GDP. The estimation method is OLS and t-statistics are
presented in parentheses in table 3.
5 The countries are selected on the basis of
their income level in 1950. The data come from the Summers and Heston
tables (1984). The population growth rate is used as a proxy for the
employment growth. A regression of GDP per capita on Y1950 gives a striking
result: it shows a positive relationship, so that 63 countries seem to have been
diverged since 1950. In the estimation in table 3 a negative correlation exists,
conditional on other variables. Although no convergence occurred, there was
TFP catch-up for all but the very poor, at a similar rate as in the OECD groups
of 24 countries (in another regression). The divergence is caused by the
relatively low investment rates in poor countries according to Dowrick and
Nguyen. In 1950 to 1973 an acceleration in growth was observed, after 1973
economic growth slowed down. No clear distinction can be made between
TFP catch-up and income convergence with the regression in the table.
Therefore Dowrick and Nguyen divided the period 1950 to 1981 in
subperiods to obtain insight in this problem. Their results are not discussed
here and the reader is referred to their article.
The Baumol et al. (1989) regressions introduced education. Table 3
shows that population growth was negatively correlated with output growth.
In the Dowrick-Nguyen regression this correlation was positive. The positive
effect of education on productivity growth was part of the ‘population’
variable in this regression. Baumol et al. disentangled the influence of
population growth and education level, where population growth becomes
counterproductive. Barro (1991) focused on education and divided the labor
force in high and low educated people. The human capital proxies are the
1960 primary and secundary school enrollment rates based on UN data.
Holding those variables constant (and others, which are less significant), the
                                                 
David Romer (1996) pointed out the fact that standard t-statistics are not suited
properly, because the estimates of the parameter for the catch-up variable are biased
negatively. A better measure would be the Dickey-Fuller unit root test (p. 176-177).55
estimated coefficient on 1960 per capita GDP is negative and highly
significant. Barro first carried out a regression for a sample of 98 countries,
which is restricted to 55 countries in the estimation represented in table 3.
Each country had an initial per capita GDP exceeding $1000. Comparing the
results of both estimations shows that the coefficient of initial income changes56
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(from -0.0075 to -0.0065, with standard errors changing from 0.0012 to
0.0010) a little. Barro argued that increases in initial GDP per capita and
contemporary increases in human capital per person do not have a strong link
with subsequent increases in the dependent variable. But holding all other
variables constant, initial GDP per capita and human capital have a robust
relationship with growth, respectively.
Barro had also taken other proxies for human capital. Furthermore,
government consumption is negatively related to per capita growth. Barro
found that high tax rates and other activities of government distort the market,
while it does not stimulate growth (and investment) significantly. According to
other estimations however, there is little correlation between public investment
and growth. As Levine and Renelt (1992) state, “... many indicators of policy,
taken individually or in groups, are correlated with growth, but the
relationship between growth and any particular indicator ... is typically
fragile” (p. 948). Barro estimated the impact of such indicators on growth, but
did not find a robust relationship.
The model of Mankiw et al. (1992), which is of a Solow type, was
augmented with human capital (see chapter 2). Their study showed that
conditional convergence takes place between countries. Barro (1991) drawed
the same conclusion. A robust negative relationship between initial GDP per
capita and the growth of GDP per capita exists, conditional on other variables.
This is however only true if human capital or education is included. Education
variables have a robust correlation with growth in GDP per capita (Barro,
1991). Investments and initial income are not linked strongly according to
Levine and Renelt (1992).
Levine and Renelt (1992) tested regressions of other scholars on the
sensitivity of the estimations of those regressions for small changes in
conditioning variables, and they showed that the regressions are very sensitive
for the inclusion of these variables. One of the regressions they comment on is
that of Barro (1991). He used several variables to test relationships which are
predicted in economic theory. But Barro did not use all these variables in one
estimation, because one of his restrictions is a maximum number of variables
in one equation, namely eight. Levine and Renelt find this assumption a
reasonably one, but in Barro’s paper the different equations include different
variables or groups of variables. Then one does not know which equations are
more or less reliable. So Levine and Renelt combine some groupings in one
estimation, of which the results are represented in the table. This shows that
only investment, initial income and the dummies for different regions or
continents are significant.
They conclude that the relationship between macroeconomic variables
and long run growth was fragile. Levine and Renelt emphasize that a robust
partial correlation does not say anything about the direction of the causality59
between the variables. “The crucial, though nettlesome, issue of empirically
identifying causal channels has not been adequately addressed by the cross-
country growth literature” (p. 944). Dowrick (1995) also argues that it is better
to try to identify structural relationships between various sources and to
estimate the growth equation accordingly. Problems of endogeneity and
simultaneous causation are often ignored. The impact of a variable cannot be
captured within a single equation framework.
Two other estimations are presented in table 3. Wolff (1991) has
estimated a growth regression over a period of 100 years with a pooled cross
section. The basic variables investment, population and education are not
taken into account. He used only a catch up variable, the relative initial level
of productivity, and the capital-labour ratio as inputs, together with country
and period dummies. The influence of the initial level is negative, while the
capital intensity has a positive influence on productivity growth. The capital-
labour ratio appears to be important for a country in the catch up race. The US
became the technological leader of the world instead of the UK in 1900 when
its capital intensity surpassed that of the UK by three times.
Evans (1995) and Quah (1994) have criticized the use of OLS in
growth regressions. Evans states that OLS cannot estimate coefficients
consistently, except under highly implausible conditions. Deviations of those
conditions can produce large biases. He applied an alternative estimation
method to the data on 78 countries over a period from 1964 to 1980, and the
results showed that the estimates by this alternative are twice as large in
magnitude as the estimated coefficients by OLS. “This result suggests that
many of the inferences reached in the empirical growth literature are invalid
and may be seriously misleading. In particular, inferences that economies
either do not converge or converge slowly toward their unconditional means
appear to result from biased estimates”, so Evans concludes (p. 1). This has
important consequences for the estimation of growth regressions. Verspagen’s
(1991) results are obtained with a nonlinear method. The education variable
has a negative correlation with productivity growth.
The problems of cross country studies are avoided in panel studies by
among others Ben-David (1995) and Kuper (1995). Ben-David showed that
countries with strong trade links and large trade volumes experience income
convergence. The convergence rate is also influenced by the trade volume
between the partners. This evidence, in correspondance with the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem, would be a “measure of reassurance to the advocates of free
trade” (p. 21). Kuper (1995) shows that relative convergence takes place
among countries which move to a world steady state. Those countries have a
growth rate higher than the average rate and an income lower than the average
level. Countries in Latin America experience relative divergence. The60
conclusion is that the gap between Asia and Latin America is widening, while
African countries and the OECD states have a stable development.61
Limitations of growth regressions
Cross country regression copes with simultaneity problems, multicollinearity
and a lack of degrees of freedom. The right hand variables in the regression
are jointly determined. Too few exogenous variables exist in cross country
data sets to establish causality between the variables under consideration. The
independent variables are correlated, so that measurement errors will work
through the estimations. The residual can contain information about those
correlations. Moving to panel studies, one meets another problem, namely that
of  business cycles, which will make the variables more volatile. However, to
get a full picture of productivity growth and its determinants, cross country
regressions and time series could be used next to each other, because growth
differentials vary in time and in place.
Historical economists have always emphasized the complexity and
richness of the dynamics of technological change. Part of this complexity is
the interaction between the variables influencing technological change and,
hence, economic growth. Physical and human capital accumulation can
influence technological progress by embodying new knowledge in new
equipment or bodies, but technological progress can in turn influence capital
accumulation by enhancing its efficiency and profitability (see for instance
Kremer, 1993). How can we disentangle the different sources of growth in
such a way that the decomposition accounts for interaction between them?
This interaction problem is more than a measurement problem in growth
regressions. It indicates the necessity of modelling by means of a system of
simultaneous equations.
Furthermore, growth regressions are very sensitive to data problems
like the growth accounts and sensitive to the choice of time and space. The
results themselves are volatile. For example, DeLong and Summers (1991)
and DeLong (1992) tried to measure the size of the link between growth and
machinery investment. They concluded that there is a strong relationship
between the variables. Albers et al. (1994) however found that this link is very
sensitive to the choice of countries and time periods. Only within homogenous
groups some convergence will take place, but then the results may be due to
sample selection biases. Moreover, Jorgenson (1995) argues that the
aggregate production function is useful in modelling long-run economic
growth trends, but its assumptions are inconsistent with empirical evidence
since 1973. A sectoral approach would explain the developments better. In
section 4.5 the background of the sectoral approach is described.
Furthermore, the old standard models are easier to test than the models with
R&D. According to Romer (1994) the R&D model must, however, be
preferred on theoretical grounds. Finally, more attention must be given to
international technological spillovers in future research. International trade or62
integration of economies leads to more diffusion and innovation and larger
economies of scale (Romer, 1990).63
4.5 Global diffusion and sectoral specialization
Investment in knowledge is important for a firm in order to gain a comparative
advantage. Intangible investments involve education, R&D, patents, software
and marketing or management. Education is embodied in human capital and
tied to physical bodies, while disembodied knowledge is reflected in the
remaining intangibles. Ideas generated from the latter intangibles are nonrival
and partially excludable (see chapter 3). Knowledge spillovers arise from
intangible investments, so that increasing returns to scale and imperfect
competition can exist. The spillover benefits can be enhanced by investments
in physical capital, such as hardware or computers, telecommunication
infrastructure and environment (Minne, 1995).
The knowledge that a firm possesses has been obtained by various
internal and external means. Internal sources are R&D of the firm itself, non-
technical research and experiences in production or learning by doing. Human
capital investments will be very important. By diffusion the firm can acquire
external knowledge. It can, possibly supported by government, buy patents or
licences from abroad and use external services. Interfirm agreements are even
more important nowadays. The firm can also procure equipment and
intermediates in which new knowledge is embodied. Finally, free exchange of
knowledge in informal relationships between researchers will spread
knowledge across firms, sectors and nations. The firm must however be able
to adopt this knowledge and this is dependent on the social capability of its
environment (SER, 1995).
This subdivision can be linked up with the distinction between foreign
and domestic knowledge. Domestic research generates new ideas which can
be patented and it enhances the adoption of foreign R&D. The capability to
adopt is very important for the diffusion and exploitation of knowledge in a
profitable way. Foreign knowledge can be acquired directly by licences or
learning and indirectly via importing embodied knowledge. Evidence shows
that for small countries foreign know-how is very important and that open
economies benefit more from productivity enhancing spillovers from abroad
than closed economies. International technology spillovers are thus crucial
and should earn more attention in studies on growth differences between
countries. Coe and Helpman (1993) for example estimate foreign returns on
R&D relatively large compared with domestic returns (section 4.6).
Through international spillovers the world economy’s knowledge is
becoming more and more a general knowledge pool, accessible for many at
(nearly) zero cost. The growth of this pool accelerates because the path-
dependency of technological progress causes cumulation of ideas which are
‘build on the giants’ shoulders’ (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993). Convergence in
scientific knowledge is taking place now. In the past decades a transition from64
internationalisation to globalisation took place (OECD, 1992).
6 The
globalisation of the world economy is reflected in international trade. This
development is caused by different factors, among which two are the most
important. Those are deregulation of finance and political developments
which enhanced liberalisation of international trade, and technological
progress which increases the pressure in global competition. Those
developments have various consequences. For instance, international
investments become more important than international trade itself.
Furthermore, international capital flows have been increased strongly and
multinationals have gained economic power which was inconceivable before.
According to Guile and Brooks (1987) the concept of a competitive
nation with a particular endowment is less applicable now because of the
globalisation. In traditional theories a ‘national system of innovation’
determines the growth differential with other countries. By now international
technological spillovers between countries are so large that little economic
advantage can be acquired by applying common technologies. Nevertheless,
Porter (OECD, 1992) argues that a national structure remains important for
firms, because an economy exists of a mix of connected clusters of firms, of
which the specific features reflect the economy’s comparative advantage.
Empirical studies show that international polarisation takes place, where the
relative position of countries in dissaggregated fields is still marked by
growing divergence and specialization (Archibugi and Pianta, 1992).
The divergence is caused by the differences in nature and institutions
of the national innovation system as well as in the social capability.
Comparative advantage has to be obtained by specialization at the sectoral
level. Sustained comparative advantage at sectoral level can be acquired from
the interaction between the determinants in the environment. Because of the
specific features of this environment and the path-dependency of the
technological development in a cluster, the innovation system will be difficult
to copy by foreigners. The easiest and cheapest way to develop specific
technological knowledge is to collaborate within clusters with other firms
which possess relevant knowledge and are prepared to share it, because of the
large capital investments which are required. The exploitation of economies of
scale and scope in one particular field, whatever this field will be, appears to
be important to obtain non-zero profits in a market with product differentiation
and imperfect competition.
                                                 
6  ‘Globalisation’ might not be the right term. Various scholars prefer ‘regionalisation’
or ‘mondialisation’.  Moreover, the used meaning of ‘globalisation’ determines where
the trend had started. Most people place this start in the beginning of the nineties, but in
this literature survey one can see globalisation as the increasing openness of economies
with respect to technologies and trade, which has already set in the previous century.65
Salter (1960) already emphasized the importance of a sectoral
approach: “... in fact, one of the points which the statistical analysis seeks to
establish is the extreme variety of growth between industries, and the
complexity of the relationships between the level and composition of output.
It is important, therefore, that we extend our understanding of these problems,
both because they are significant in their own right, and as a step towards a
less over-simplified aggregative analysis” (p. 2). Englander and Gurney
(1994) argue that industry level data provide information on whether
convergence has proceeded unevenly across industries due to regulation or
structure. In Appendix B, table B.15 presents some figures about the
developments within three major sectors since 1960. The table shows that the
growth rates of labour productivity differ significantly among the three sectors
in both the Netherlands and the US. Furthermore, the relative increase in
sectoral labour productivity with regard to the other two sectors differs
between the countries.
Growth theorists argue that the shift of employment between sectors
with different productivities is one of the main factors behind productivity
growth. Marshall (1920) already predicted clustering to enhance efficiency in
production. According to Krugman (1991) chance plays a large role in the
development of such clusters. Which location and technology will be used is
the consequence of coincidence and not of taste, technology development or
factor endowments. An example is Silicon Valley in the US. Such core
industries will, however, form the spearheads in international competition.
Kuznets (1981) emphasises the sectoral or structural change in the
composition of among others trade and demand variables. According to
Mansfield (1968) a change in technology can lead to displacement of
workers; hence income and substitution effects will emerge. However,
clustering of firms will follow and in the longer run the consequence of the
shift can be positive through acquisition of a comparative advantage.
Inter- and intrasectoral differences reflect the complexity of economic
patterns. Those differences are caused by the coexistence of different
technology systems and by the uneven rates of diffusion and exploitation of
technologies in different sectors. According to OECD (1992) inter-industry
spillovers are more important than intra-industry spillovers. The productivity
of firms depends more on innovations elsewhere than the own innovations.
Table 3.5 in Archibugi and Pianta (1992) shows this trend very clearly.
Industries with similar technology systems experience larger spillovers than
those which are not close with regard to technology. Industries are also
unequally affected by spillovers. Industries with relatively high R&D shares
show a positive relationship between their own R&D and rival innovations.
Own research enhances the capability to adopt ideas from abroad. If the firms
only purchase innovations, this has less impact on economic efficiency.66
The sectoral approach has already been used by various scholars. For
instance, at the University of Groningen, the International Comparisons on
Output and Productivity (ICOP) project is striving for comparable industry
level accounts complementary to the accounts of the International
Comparisons Project (ICP), which is carried out by among others Summers
and Heston (1984). The ICP approach compares expenditure prices, while the
ICOP estimates are based on producer prices. The ICOP accounts, developed
by among others Maddison and Van Ark (1994) involve real output changes
(in comparative levels) in agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services.
For a comparison between countries, appropriate purchasing power parities
are used to convert national estimates into a common numeraire. The ICOP
comparisons have been mainly bilateral until now, because most attention of
the project researchers is directed to international technology diffusion and the
process of catch up with the leading countries by followers. An example of
sectoral growth accounting with respect to structural change is the paper of
Van Ark (1994). One conclusion drawn in this article is that intrasectoral
changes in productivity are the major factor in explaining productivity growth
at the aggregate level in post war Europe. The structural changes are narrowly
defined as shifts in employment between high and low productivity sectors.
Kuznets’ definition of structural change is broader and includes also changes
in trade and demand patterns in different sectors. In section 4.6, spillover
studies, originating from both empirical and theoretical side or combining
them, are discussed. They also applied firm or industry level data.
4.6 Technological spillovers
This section discusses various studies which apply data on R&D, patents and
licenses. Schmookler (1966) and Mansfield (1968) were one of the first
scholars who saw the advantages of a microeconomic approach which should
endogenize as much of technological change as was possible. Griliches
(1994) applied their ideas and measured technological indicators of R&D
efforts, patenting and licenses. Minne (1995) and others also measured
foreign and domestic R&D. Growth theorists made use of the efforts of these
studies. Among others Lichtenberg (1992), Wolff and Nadiri (1993) and Jaffe
et al. (1993) estimated the magnitude of knowledge spillovers and returns on
R&D efforts, sometimes distinguishing foreign and domestic returns.
Caballero and Jaffe (1993), Coe and Helpman (1993) and various others
constructed models with endogenized technology, founded on the most recent
growth theories of among others Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1996) which also
apply ideas of historically oriented economists. They tried to verify the
Schumpeterian models with help of data on technology.67
R&D and patent data
The Schmookler and Mansfield studies tried to quantify relationships between
technology data and economic growth at industry level. A sectoral viewpoint
can yield new insights in economic relationships and structures, as is
discussed in section 4.5. Schmookler’s (1966) goal was to explain variations
in invention an space and over time. He used patents as a proxy for
inventions. This was justified as long as one beared in mind that not all
inventions are patented, that some inventions are not measured and that there
are differences in quality of inventions. Unfortunately, he lacked independent
measures of inventions: “...in most instances the choice is not between patent
statistics and better data, but between patent statistics and no data” (p. 198).
Patent statistics are used as an index, so that only large differences appear to
be significant. Case studies are more accepted, but these studies have their
own problems.
Schmookler found a high correlation between industrial spending on
R&D in 1953 and patent applications of the firms which made these
expenditures. Furthermore, he found an imperfect correspondence between
patent statistics and other forms of knowledge, such as the difference between
independent and corporate inventions, empirical and scientific driven
inventions, inventions made by individuals and in laboratoria, and full time
and part time inventions. Schmookler was convinced that inventions were
determined by demand conditions, illustrating this argument with the example
of the horseshoe. The S-shaped growth curve of an industry, which is also
valid for inventions, reflects demand forces. The saturation phase would be
more restrictive than diminishing marginal returns to inventive activity. The
relationship between investments and innovations demonstrates that the latter
are a result of past decisions on investments and that they in turn generate new
investments. Investments are only made if they are profitable or expected to
be profitable. On the supply side, within the industries, technologies to
produce the desired products are selected out of a pool of possible
technologies. Schmookler stated that “the combination of a richer knowledge
base underlying the product technologies of some industries and possible
shifts in the characteristics desired in inventions thus results in substantial
interindustry variation in the patent-sales ratio” (p. 212).
Mansfield (1968) emphasized both demand and supply forces
underlying an innovation. A new technology had to be economically and
technically attractive, otherwise it would remain a potentiality. The growth rate
of total productivity was a function of the R&D-sales ratio, the growth rate of
output and the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations. The relationships were,
however, not causal, but only tentative correlations. Furthermore,68
technological change must be embodied in new equipment to be utilized.
Mansfield concluded that the rate of diffusion increased if innovations did not
replace very durable equipment and if the industry was growing rapidly. His
findings on interindustry differences in productivity terms and in technologies
were consistent with the hypothesis that rates of diffusion are higher in less
concentrated industries.
Mansfield’s measurement problems remained numerous, like for
Schmookler (1966) and later researchers like Griliches (1992, 1994). The
measurement of total productivity, such as he did, was an indirect method to
measure technological change. Moreover, total productivity captured other
factors than technological change, as is discussed in chapters 2, 3 and section
4.3. Other measurement problems were the definition of capital and the
assumptions underlying the analyses such as the neutrality of technological
change and absence of economies of scale. Finally, the extent to which
technological change was embodied was difficult to measure.
According to Griliches (1992), three measurement issues arised from
the analysis of productivity growth and its sources. First, the relative growth
of the sector of private services, government and other public institutions had
increased the measurement problem. The products of this sector were not
defined well and its productivity was and is still very difficult to measure. The
consequence is that a growing part of historical accounts are badly or not
measured at all. A second problem is the deflation of variables. Third, how do
we measure technological change? Griliches (1994) used data on R&D to
indicate the development of technology, not because they are such a good
indicator, but because our understanding “is constrained by the extent and
quality of the available data”      (p. 2).
In Griliches’ opinion a part of the difficulty to estimate the impact of
variables on productivity growth is due to the misinterpretation of data caused
by “inadequate attention to how they are produced” (p. 2). Therefore, the
observed decline in the patent-R&D ratio was not really due to exhaustion of
inventive opportunities, but mainly due to interpretation problems. The
economy’s structure had changed and the collection of data had not kept pace
with it. There was “little professional agreement on what is to be measured
and how” (p. 14).
Griliches (1994) argued that the estimations of R&D spillovers
affecting productivity growth in various studies like Wolff and Nadiri (1993)
showed that they were real, but that their magnitudes were modest and not
enough to account for the bulk of the residual. The same was valid for studies
which tried to embody technological change in capital accumulation. After
analysis of data on R&D, Griliches concluded that there was no real decline in
relative expenditures on R&D, but that there was a widening gap between69
social and private returns, due to the internationalization of R&D, increased
competition and the change in the exchange rates.
Schmookler (1966) had concluded that “we can now predict within
comparatively narrow limits the number of inventions that will be made in
capital goods fields, and there is reason to suppose that, with further research,
a similar statement about invention in consumer goods fields will also prove
possible”      (p. 215). Griliches (1994), however, argued that invention and
innovation are fundamentally uncertain, so that the emergence of a particular
innovation will be unpredictable. A “fully ‘endogenous’ theory of
technological change” (p. 18) is very unlikely. Solow (1994, p. 52) also
observed this problem. However, in Griliches’ (1994) opinion, future
researchers will have to explain the residual better ex post.
Finally, Griliches advocated the expansion of the framework of the
analysis of productivity growth and its sources. Disequilibria and the
measurement of knowledge and other externalities must be at the centerpoint
of attention in such an extension. He argued that modern growth theories are
right in emphasizing the role of knowledge externalities, but that they cannot
explain the developments in the past two decades, because there is “no reason
to believe that they [knowledge externalities] have declined over time” (p.
16). A more fruitful approach would be the development of models of
externalities which are “models of interaction between different actors in the
economy” (p. 16). An example is that of Jaffe et al. (1993), who examined the
citation-patents ratio and scientific literature, but according to Griliches these
data are just a small part of the exchanges in informal networks.
Externality studies
Nadiri (1993) explored studies to find evidence on R&D investment,
especially the question of diminishing returns on inventive activities, the
relationship with productivity and the return on R&D, and the magnitudes of
spillovers on firm, industry or country level. Nadiri concluded that one could
neither say that there are diminishing returns on innovation nor that there are
no diminishing returns, because the used yardsticks of patent numbers and
R&D were unadequate and caused measurement problems (see Nadiri, 1993).
However, studies often showed that the rates of return to own R&D are high
and that there are significant spillover effects from R&D, so that Nadiri
supposed that diminishing returns to innovation are less plausible (p. 34).
Furthermore, R&D affected the growth rates of output and TFP positively and
strongly, although the magnitude of its impact varied in space. Moreover,
R&D investments interact with other inputs. The average rates of return on
R&D vary among the studies between 20 to 30 per cent at firm level and
between 10 to 30 per cent at industry level. Evidence also demonstrated that70
since the 1970s TFP growth had slowed down and R&D expenditures
decreased.
With respect to R&D spillovers, Nadiri found significant international
spillover effects, growing over time. On average, the social rate of return is 50
per cent. Within the OECD, many technology transfers took place, especially
via multinationals. Technologies were diffused in various ways: “.. They may
take the form of intra- and interindustry relationships, interdependence
between public and private sector investment, supplier and purchaser
connections, and geographical location, as well as between domestic firms
and firms in other countries through international technology market trade and
multinational enterprises” (p. 35). Finally, spillovers also induce changes in
structures of production and rate of profitability, next to productivity growth.
R&D spillovers account for more than half of TFP growth. Nadiri concluded
that there is some underinvestment in R&D, although high rates of return are
required to compensate for uncertainty surrounding the innovation.
Wolff and Nadiri (1993) studied the relationships between R&D,
technological change and intersectoral linkages. They found that R&D
embodied in capital stock generated sizeable spillovers among all sectors.
Furthermore, suppliers and purchasers in manufacturing experienced close
links in their growth rates of TFP. Sectors which were strongly linked also had
relatively higher R&D expenditures and higher TFP growth rates. Finally,
Wolff and Nadiri concluded that private R&D provided stronger spillover
effects than total (embodied) R&D, which included governmental R&D.
Lichtenberg (1992) drawed the same conclusion about the difference in
returns on governmental and private R&D.
As mentioned above, Griliches (1994) advocated the approach used in
Jaffe et al. (1993). The latter observed that various studies were carried out on
the relationship between R&D expenditures (own or imported) and
productivity growth, but that these studies did not analyse the geographical
localization of the knowledge spillovers, while the question was important
enough: “...Is there any advantage to nearby firms, or even firms in the same
country, or do spillover waft into the ether, available for anyone around the
globe to grab?” (p. 577). Krugman (1991) and Marshall (1920) already
acknowledged the role of localization (see section 4.5). In the growth
literature of the 1980s knowledge was assumed to spill over within a country,
but not between countries. Only when Grossman and Helpman (1991)
explicitly recognized the importance of international technological spillovers,
the interest in localization was renewed. Jaffe et al. (1993) argued that
spillovers “leave a paper trail in the form of citations” (p. 595), which is
geographically localized. They found significant effects of localization. This
localization fades over time, but only slowly. The technological character of
the patents cited did not seem to affect the localization process, but Jaffe et al.71
thought better measurements would generate new insights. Finally, Jaffe et al.
did not find strong evidence of differences in localization around universities
and firms. According to the authors, more research on the phenomenon of
localization was required.
Endogenous technological change: the first little steps
The convincing power of models developed by among others Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992, 1996) and Young
(1993a, 1993b), turned more scholars to models with Schumpeterian
elements, which incorporate elements like uncertainty and variety of products.
The Aghion and Howitt models (1992, 1996) provide good starting points of
empirical studies which estimate the impact of innovation on productivity and
output growth. Caballero and Jaffe (1993) and Coe and Helpman (1993) also
acquired new insights which largely affected the way of thinking of various
others. Eaton and Kortum (1995) are another illustration of the new road taken
nowadays. They studied the relative role of foreign and domestic sources of
innovation, a distinction which is important in a globalizing world. Not only
growth theorists were beginning to approach the empirical area, but the
empirical scholars themselves also applied ideas used in modern growth
models, for instance Crafts (1995b).
Jaffe’s et al. (1993) emphasis on the role of international technological
spillovers can be retrieved in Coe and Helpman (1993) and Eaton and Kortum
(1995). Coe and Helpman proved that the interaction between international
trade and foreign R&D generated significant international R&D spillovers
among trade partners. Foreign knowledge spills over via learning,
organisation and production processes, or indirect by importing embodied
technological knowledge. Domestic R&D, however, remains important in that
it enhances the effective use of resources and the country’s ability to adopt
foreign knowledge. The estimates of Coe and Helpman showed that TFP
growth was affected by both foreign and domestic R&D, where foreign R&D
affects domestic productivity more the more open the economy to
international trade or the smaller it is. This result has already been discussed in
section 4.5.
Caballero and Jaffe (1993) developed a multisectoral model in the
spirit of both Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
The title of their study expresses the ideas they borrowed from early scholars
like Schmookler (1966) and Schumpeter (1934). Schmookler’s idea of the
inventor is that of an agent who used knowledge of the past. In the model of
Caballero and Jaffe new knowledge emerged from the existing pool (the
giants’ shoulders). The Schumpeterian element in the model was reflected in
the process of creative destruction, in which innovation is endogenous.72
Caballero and Jaffe captured this process by the rate of decline of
entrepreneurial profits, which depends positively on “the degree of
substitutability between new and old goods and on the pace at which new
goods are introduced” (p. 17). Caballero and Jaffe applied R&D, patent and
citation data for their estimations of knowledge spillovers.
The results of their estimations indicated a speeding up of the rate of
diffusion in this century. The foreign knowledge spillovers “approximately
balance the increased rate of knowledge obsolescence that they also create”
(p. 69). However, Caballero and Jaffe also predicted a decreased private
productivity of research inputs. They were also puzzled with the observation
that the patent-R&D ratio had fallen, like Griliches (1994). Caballero and Jaffe
argued that if the size of patents increased enough, the idea-R&D ratio did not
necessarily fall. They found this difficult to prove for the last decades,
although the size of patents had grown since the beginning of this century.
Furthermore, Caballero and Jaffe demonstrated that the rate of invention and
the growth rate of productivity move closely together. The model can explain
some of the slowdown in aggregate productivity and the fall in patent
numbers since the 1970s, but the result is sensitive to changes in the
assumptions of the model.
Eaton and Kortum (1995) carried on with the research on international
spillovers by Lichtenberg (1992), Coe and Helpman (1993) and Caballero and
Jaffe (1993) and combined them with ideas expressed by historically oriented
economists like Gerschenkron (1962). The estimation results on the capital-
output ratio suggested that productivity in manufacturing sectors of
industrialized countries (Germany, France, UK, Japan and the US) is affected
by the ability to adopt more productive technologies rather than by capital
accumulation. Eaton and Kortum developed a model which fitted the post-war
developments of manufacturing productivity well. They concluded that after
the Second World War countries converged technologically, conditional on
their ability to adopt.
Crafts (1995b) took the historical viewpoint of the empirist and
drawed lessons for economic history from theoretical modelling, combining
them with insights from history. According to Crafts, growth theory had little
to offer before the mid-1980s. After that time the new growth models
provided a deeper understanding of growth processes and were able to
exchange ideas with economic history literature (p. 3). Crafts (1995b),
however, did not explored the most recent models of creative destruction and
concentrated on models like that of Grossman and Helpman (1991). Crafts
encouraged better quantification of institutional variables. He also argued that
the role of R&D as opposed to learning, and that of patents and market size as
opposed to other determinants of profitability of innovations is exaggerated
somewhat in modern growth models, while the emphasis on international73
technology transfers is overdue (p. 45). Moreover, Schumpeterian growth
models had to take into account the fact that trends in growth rates often
change between epochs, as can be seen between the Golden Age and the
slowdown period in the past two decades.74
Conclusion
The previous chapters have shown that many economists believe that
technological progress plays an important role in productivity growth (in
Kuznets’ opinion this statement is a truism (1965, p. 61)), though it is not the
sole determinant. As Denison (1993) wrote: “If one were forced to choose a
single growth source as most important in the long run, the choice would have
to be advances in knowledge” (p. 58). After the introduction in chapter 1,
chapters 2 and 3 displayed the theories of neoclassical economists, whereas in
chapter 4 the empirical approaches of various scholars were described.
A co-operation between theoretical and empirical approaches
The theoretical and empirical views should collaborate to benefit from each
others results. An advantage for the modern growth theory to look at empirical
studies is that the plausibility of endogenous growth theory can be tested with
the help of historical growth accounts (Solow, 1994). Until now, most tests of
growth theory concern the validity of the Solow type model and its
assumptions, such as Mankiw et al. (1992) have done. Endogenous growth
theory however has no strong empirical basis yet. A few efforts have been
made in this direction by among others Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Furthermore, the role of dynamic returns to scale, externalities from R&D, the
accumulation of human capital and endogenous innovation have always been
crucial in the empirical area. Those elements seem to be taken up by recent
growth theory, which has enriched the analysis. Moreover, a look on history
would give the theory a broader insight in the richness and dynamics of
interactions between technology (and other economic variables) and
economic growth. The traditional neoclassical models are too simple in this
respect (Pack, 1994). Theoretical niceties, however, must not be
overestimated. Kuznets (1965) emphasized that theory has to be considered as
just a guide to further study of data and to direct future research (p. 5).
The gains for economic historians and other empirists come from the
possibility to formalize their insights in a structural model, which will clear
some fuzzy and vague empirical hypotheses. The formal framework will also
force them to be consequent in their ideas on technology, which are
sometimes badly arranged. Their ideas about catch up, convergence and
social capability are still difficult to incorporate in a growth regression.
However, the first efforts are made by among others Caballero and Jaffe
(1993). Moreover, growth accounting is no theory of growth. The accounts
can only describe the relative influence of economic variables on productivity
growth. They cannot explain why those particular variables are determining75
the growth rates, or which causal relationship exists between the variables and
labour productivity growth. The accounts only assume some relationship
between variables. Those assumptions are deduced from theory. This can
become a problem, if growth accounts are used to test theory. Only theory can
explain the causality between observed variables. However, the growth
accounts can serve as an complement to growth regressions. They are a first
step towards the analysis of the more ultimate causes of growth, although
those causes are very difficult to stylize.
The recent developments, from 1990 onward, give reason for some
optimism with respect to a collaboration between different views. Why this
has not happened systematically yet, may be the consequence of the spirits of
the past decades and developments in economic science. Nowadays,
economists from both sides acknowledge that endogenous technological
change has a crucial role in economic growth and that it has to be seen in a
historical context. An example is the article of Eaton and Kortum (1995), as
discussed in section 4.6. Solow (1994) wrote: “ The best source of empirical
material may be historical case studies, but then the test of truth is bound to be
fuzzy. The best bet, no doubt, would be collaboration between model-builders
and those who use informal methods, to compromise between one side’s need
for definiteness and the other side’s sense of complexity” (p. 52).
Path-dependent technological change in a growth model
From both points of view some key elements are deduced that must be
incorporated in an ‘integrated’ model. On the one hand, modern growth
theory, discussed in chapter 3, offers some interesting subjects. Until now,
most empirical studies which test growth theory (section 4.4), have only tested
the traditional model with exogenous technological change, as described in
chapter 2 (Solow, 1994). Now the modern line of research must be taken up
and technological progress has to be incorporated in an endogenous model. In
order to form an idea of technological developments, data on patents, licenses
and R&D are of great value, as appeared from section 4.6. The idea of
technological indicators in growth regressions is an appealing one and the
companying measurement problems have to be tackled seriously. Recent
growth models are more realistic and incorporate Schumpeterian ideas.
Furthermore, human and physical capital accumulation and increasing returns
to scale must also have a role in a formal model, so that spillovers from
technology and learning by doing can be modelled in this way.
On the other hand, three aspects deduced from recent empirical results
have to be emphasized in future research. First, a long period has to be
considered to catch small changes in variables, such as Kuznets (1965, p. 5)
emphasized. Only then the path-dependency of economic development,76
emphasized in section 4.2, can be highlighted. Maddison’s (1995) figures and
that of other growth accountants (section 4.3) show that some variables only
change very slowly over time. The supply side of the economy, where the
adaptive capacity is adjusted in the long run, will thus determine growth,
while the demand side with fluctuations in factors and prices of commodities
will be relatively less important. The lagged impact of inventions can be taken
into account, together with institutional changes which affect productivity
growth. Another aspect that is linked with the long run view, is the notion of
epochs in growth, as is sketched in section 1.2. Each period has its own
specific features which affect productivity growth and with which a researcher
has to work.
Second, international technology spillovers or diffusion appear to be
very important (section 4.6), causing growth differences between countries
and sectors. Formal theorists like Grossman and Helpman (1994) have already
included those spillovers in their models. Next to imperfect competition,
increasing returns to scale and incomplete allocation they emphasize the
international interdependence of countries. Third, a sectoral approach,
discussed in section 4.5, would enrich the analysis of the complex changes in
the world economy. Jorgenson’s (1995) sectoral approach is also combined
with estimations of growth regressions. The role of institutions should also to
be taken into account, although this will be very difficult. Some have argued
that technology (its change and nature), institutions (the ‘network’), and the
tension between both forces determine the course of technological
development and the trend in productivity growth rates.77
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Appendix A The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model
In this appendix the neoclassical model is placed in an infinite horizon
optimizing framework, in which intertemporal choices of consumption are
made. This framework is developed by Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965)
and founded on the model of Ramsey (1928).
Consumers maximize their intertemporal utility subject to the accumulation
equation and initial conditions, with c = C/L and k = K/L:
7
Max U(0) = oò
¥ e
-(r-n)t[u(ct)]dt  = oò
¥  e
-(r-n)t[(ct
1-s-1)/(1-s)]dt    (A.1)
subject to
k° = f(k) - c - nk - dk      and       k0 > 0.                 
(A.2)
The instantaneous utility u(ct) is a CIES function, which warrants a constant
elasticity of marginal utility in steady state, so the growth rate of consumption
will be constant.
8 The discount rate r represents the impatience of current
generations to consume now and taking care less of future generations.
Population grows with exogenous rate n. Produced goods Y are consumed or
invested: Y=C+I, with I = dK/dt -dK, d being the depreciation rate. If
depreciation is zero, this would not affect the outcome of the model
fundamentally. In chapter 2, depreciation is assumed to be zero.
 Because
Y=C+I, investments are equal to savings. If k = K/L, then the resource
constraint of k° must be satisfied. The per capita production function f(k)
satisfies the Inada conditions. The Cobb Douglas production function is an
example of such a production function. Further, for U(0) to be bounded, the
term inside the integral must go to zero as t goes to infinity. This implies that
the discount rate is larger than n.
                                                 
7 In this case the households produce the good. In a market eco nomy firms pay the
factors of production their marginal rate. If these earnings are substituted in an
individual budget constraint, the r esulting outcome of such a market model is the same as
that of the household economy.
8 CIES means ‘constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution’. This utility function
warrants that the elasticity of substitution  s is constant intertemporally. The elasticity is
equal to s = -u’(c)/[u”(c)xc], which is the reciprocal of the elasticity of ma rginal utility.
From the Euler equation, which runs as  f’(k) = r - [(u”(c)xc)/u’(c)]x(c°/c), follows that
to find a steady state in which  f’(k) and c°/c are constant, the intertemporal ela sticity of
substitution must be constant.86
To solve the maximization problem, a Hamiltionian is set up. The first order
conditions are derived from the Hamiltonian. The Euler equations are used to
deduce the condition for consumption growth:
gc = c°/c = s
 -1(f’(k) - r - d),       (A.3)
which can be rewritten as r + sgc = f’(k) - d. The left hand side is the rate of
return to consumption, the right hand side the return on investment. An
optimizing individual consumer is indifferent between both returns in
equilibrium. If the production function is a Cobb Douglas without
technological progress, then Y = K
aL
b. In the neoclassical model there are
constant returns to scale: a+b=1. In per capita terms the production function
is y = k
a. The equations (A.2) and (A.3) become
k° = k




-(1-a) - r - d).              
(A.3)’
In steady state the growth rates of capital and consumption are constant. The
growth rate of capital-labour ratio is equal to k
a-1 - c/k -n - d. Taking logs and
derivatives of c/k (after rearranging) we get the result that the growth rates of
k and c must be equal to each other. Then they have to be zero, otherwise
there will be no steady state. In steady state
f’(k) = r + d.    (A.4)
With Harrod neutral technological progress, the Cobb-Douglas production
function is with constant returns to scale
Y = F(K, AL) = K
aAL
1-a.    (A.5)
Defining ‘effective labour’ as Lt’ = L0e
(n+x)t, we have a production function in
effective labour units yt’ = f(kt’) with kt’=Kt/Lt’ (as described in chapter 2).The
accumulation equation runs as follows:
k
’° = Ak
a - c’ - nk’ - dk’.    (A.2)”
Here u(ct’) is defined in effective labour units in the intertemporal utility
function. After setting up the Hamiltonian and deriving the first order87
conditions the following steady state condition for consumption results (the
growth rate of k and c being zero):
f’(k’) = r + sx + d.    (A.4)’88
Appendix B Empirical studies of growth
Table B.1 Development of GDP per capita
                     (in 1990 International Dollars)
 1820  1870  1900  1913  1950  1973  1992
France 1218 1858 2849 3452 5521 12940 17959
Germany 1112 1913 3134 3833 4281 13152 19351
Netherlands 1561 2640 3533 3950 5850 12763 16898
UK 1756 3263 4593 5032 6847 11992 15738
USA 1287 2457 4096 5307 9573 16607 21558
Japan 704 741 1135 1334 1873 11017 19425
Source: Maddison (1995), table 1.3, p. 23.
Table B.2 Phases of per capita real GDP growth, 1820-1992




France     0.8     1.5     1.1     4.0     1.7
Germany     1.1     1.6     0.3     5.0     2.1
Netherlands     1.1     0.9     1.1     3.4     1.4
UK     1.2     1.0     0.8     2.5     1.4
USA     1.3     1.8     1.6     2.4     1.4
Japan     0.1     1.4     0.9     8.0     3.0
Source: Maddison (1995), table 3.2, p. 62.
Table B.3. Rate of growth of labour productivity, 1870-1992




France     1.7     1.9     5.1     2.7
Germany     1.9     0.6     6.0     2.7
Netherlands     1.3     1.3     4.8     2.2
UK     1.2     1.6     3.1     2.2
USA     1.9     2.5     2.7     1.1
Japan     1.9     1.9     7.7     3.1
Source: Maddison (1995), table 3.13a, p. 79.89
Table B.4 Broadberry (1994a): Manufacturing output per person employed
                   (UK = 100)
US/UK Ge/UK Jap/UK
1869   203.8
1875   100.0
1879   187.8
1889   195.4     94.7
1899   194.8     99.0
1907   190.0   106.4     20.7
1913   212.9   119.0     24.4
1920   222.8     27.0
1925   234.2     95.2     25.1
1929   249.9   104.7     32.2
1935   207.8 *102.0     38.8
1937 *208.3     99.9     39.4
1950   262.6     96.0     19.9
1958   250.0   111.1     35.5
1968   242.6   120.0     72.5
1975   207.5   132.9   102.9
1980   192.8   140.2   133.8
1985   182.3   121.5   140.0
1987   188.8   107.8   137.4
1989   177.0   105.1 *143.1
Source: Broadberry (1994a), table 1, p. 293. The symbol * marks the benchmark year
from which the time series are extrapolated. In the original table figures are given in
brackets behind the numbers of some of the years. Those figures, now deleted, are actual
benchmark comparisons.























1909 0.335 0.623   2.06 -0.017 1.000
1919 0.354 0.767   2.47 -0.076 1.157
1929 0.332 0.895   3.06 -0.043 1.251
1939 0.347 1.034   2.66  0.050 1.514
1949 0.326 1.275   2.70     -- 1.809
Source: Solow (1957), table 1, pp. 406-407. Table B.5 is an abridged version. In table 1
(Solow, 1957), the sign of technological change (column  (4)) is often positive, so this
abridged version gives a somewhat distorted picture.90
Table B.6 Denison (1967): US growth of national income per person









National income          2.15 100
Total factor input          0.79         36
    Labour          0.22         10
    Capital          0.60         27
    Land         -0.03         -1
Output per unit of input          1.36        64
    Advances of knowledge          0.75        34
    Improved allocation resources          0.29        13
    Economies of scale          0.36        16
    Irregularities in demand         -0.04
Adjusted growth rates
    National income          2.19
    Output per unit of input          1.40
Source: Denison (1967), tables 21-1 and 21-2, pp. 298-299. This table is an abridged
version of the original table of Denison. The contribution of labour is divided in four
categories in the original table: employment (-), hours of work (-0.17, -8%), age-sex
composition (-0.10, -5%) and education (0.49, +22%). Capital contributes in four ways
to the growth rate: dwellings (0.21, +10%), international assets (0.04, +2%),
nonresidential structures and equipment (0.29, +13%) and inventories (0.06, +3%). With
respect to ‘Advances in knowledge’, in growth accounts of countries of North Western
Europe an additional factor is given, namely ‘changes in lag in application of knowledge,
general efficiency, and errors and omissions (reduction in age of capital and other
sources)’. Together those factors form the Residual.  ‘Improved allocation of resources’
is divided in three categories: contraction of agricultural inputs (0.25, +11%),
contraction of nonagricultural self-employment (0.04, +2%) and reduction of
international trade barriers (-). ‘Economies of scale’ contributes to growth via growth of
national market measured in US prices  (0.30, +14%) and independent growth of global
markets (0.06, +3%). The growth rates of sources expressed in percentages of national
income are the adjusted growth rates, corrected for ‘demand irregularities’.91











France 4.80        33 3.67 41
Germany 5.15        31 4.43 36
Netherlands 3.65        34 2.79 42
UK 1.63 46 2.41 67
US 2.15        34 1.36 55
Source: Denison (1967), tables 21.1, 21.2, 21.9 - 21.14, 21.17, 21.18 (pp. 298-315).
Table B.8 Kendrick (1976): Major components of US growth, 1929-1969
                  (average annual percentage rates of change)
1929-69 1929-48 1948-69
Real GNP, adjusted     3.4     2.7     4.0
Real total capital     2.8     2.2     3.5
      Tangible     2.4     1.8     3.1
      Intangible     3.8     3.2     4.3
Residual     0.6     0.5     0.5
Source: Kendrick (1976), table 5.1, p. 113.
Table B.9 Kendrick (1993): Sources of growth in the US
1929-69 1929-48 1948-69
Real GNP, adjusted     3.4     2.2     4.0
Human capital, weighted   1.45   1.12   1.79
     % of growth   42.6   41.5   44.8
Nonhuman capital, weight.   1.38   1.00   1.67
     % of growth   40.6   37.0   41.8
Total capital services   2.83   2.12   3.46
Residual   0.57   0.58   0.54
     % of growth   16.8   21.5   13.5
Source: Kendrick (1993), p. 143, supplemented with ‘Real GNP, adjusted’.92
Table B.10 Maddison (1991): GDP growth in the US, 1913-1987
                    (annual average compound % contributions to GDP growth)
1913-50 1950-73 1973-87
GDP     2.79     3.65     2.51
Augmented factor input     1.53     2.54     2.55
Foreign trade effect     0.04     0.07     0.07
Structural effect 0.29     0.12    -0.11
Technology diffusion     0.00     0.00     0.00
Scale     0.08     0.11     0.08
Energy effect     0.00     0.01    -0.18
Natural resources windfall     0.00     0.00     0.00
Total explained     1.94     2.86     2.41
Unexplained residual     0.83     0.77     0.10
Source: Maddison (1991), table 5.19, p.159. The contribution of the factor ‘structural
effect’ in the column of the period 1913-1950 is actually computed over the period
1909-1939.
Table B.11 Maddison (1991): Unexplained percentage of growth, 1913-1987
1913-50 1950-73 1973-87
France      49      37      29
Germany      13      38      28
Japan        6      14        6
Netherlands        5      18      30
UK      26      25      42
USA      30      13        4
Average      21      24      23
Source: Maddison (1991), table 5.20, p. 160. In this table percentages of growth which
are explained are given. In table B.11 the unexplained parts are presented.
Table B.12 Maddison (1995): Growth performance US, 1820-1992
                   (average annual compound growth rates)
1820-70
1870-
1913 1913-50 1950-73 1973-92
1820-
1992
GDP / hour worked 1.10 1.88 2.48 2.74 1.11 1.81
TFP -0.15 0.33 1.59 1.72 0.18 0.63
Natural resources 1.41 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.41
Total hours 3.09 2.02 0.35 1.15 1.27 1.77
Nonres. capitalstock 5.46 5.53 2.01 3.27 3.13 4.18
Source: Maddison (1995), table K-2, p. 255.93
Table B.13 Abramovitz (1993): Labour productivity growth in the US,















1800-1855 0.42 0.22 0.20 0.48
1855-1890 1.06 0.70 0.36 0.34
1890-1927 2.01 0.62 1.40 0.69
Kendrick
1890-1927 2.00 0.51 1.49 0.74
1927-1966 2.67 0.56 2.14 0.79
1966-1989 1.40 0.62 0.78 0.54
Source: Abramovitz (1993), table 1, p. 223. The figures in the three periods from 1800 to
1927 are estimations of David (revised). The period 1890-1927 is added to provide for
overlap with Kendrick’s estimates from 1890 to 1989, which are derived by Abramovitz
from Kendrick’s constructions or based on his data. For details, see Abramovitz (1993).
Table B.14 Development of R&D per person employed
                    ($ in 1985 relative prices)
1960 1973 1987
France 207 448 761
Germany 179 848
Japan 89 342 757
Netherlands 291 514 687
UK 343 480 650
USA 809 814 1074
Source: Maddison (1991), table 5.15, p. 152.
Table B.15 Sectoral labour productivity growth
                    (Gross value added per person employed)
1909-48 1950-73 1973-87
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishery
   Netherlands NA 6.0 4.4
   USA 1.6 5.4 2.4
Industry
   Netherlands NA 5.6 1.5
   USA 1.5 2.2 1.1
Services
   Netherlands NA 1.8 0.4
   USA 1.0 1.4 0.2
Source: Maddison (1991), table 5.13, p. 150.